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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP PRACTICES
IN THE 75TH RANGER REGIMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES H. JOHNSON III, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1986

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP PRACTICES IN THE 75TH RANGER REGIMENT by MAJ James H. Johnson III, USA, 123 pages.

This study examines what effect unit culture has on leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment. The study investigates how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment developed. Through a survey questionnaire administered to selected leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment, it explores prevailing views on the effect unit culture has on leadership practices.

Data from the study suggests three conclusions. First, executive leaders are more likely than mid-level leaders to delegate actions to lower levels of the unit. Secondly, mid-level leaders are likely to identify and eliminate soldiers who can not meet established standards. Finally, mid-level leaders are likely to risk new methods to achieve mission accomplishment. These leadership practices demonstrate characteristics of an adaptive or learning organization. First, leaders are willing to decentralize control in order to increase motivation and initiative. Second, leaders feel a sense of personal mastery that drives them to uphold shared values. Finally, leaders are not risk-averse and believe in being proactive problem solvers.

This study recommends that the 75th Ranger Regiment should execute an aggressive junior-leader-training program. Second, the 75th Ranger Regiment should allow sufficient time for junior leaders to conduct subordinate level training. Finally, all levels of leaders in the unit should be involved in the long-term policy development process.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JTF	Joint Task Force
MSG	Master Sergeant
NCO	Non-commissioned Officers
PDF	Panamanian Defense Force
RASP	Ranger Assessment and Selection Program
RIP	Ranger Indoctrination Program
ROP	Ranger Orientation Program
SEAL	Sea-Air-Land Team
SFC	Sergeant First Class
SOF	Special Operations Force
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Task Force Ranger mission had been a complete success up to this point. The six key lieutenants of the ethnic warlord, who had been terrorizing the country, were now under the control of the highly trained special operations soldiers. The takedown of the building and the securing of the enemy personnel went exactly as Task Force Ranger had practiced in numerous briefbacks, rehearsals, and simulations. All that remained to complete the mission was the extraction and a quick exfiltration back to the relative safety of the ISB (Intermediate Staging Base). The special operations force leader confidently looked back on the objective building as he prepared to call for the extraction aircraft. Activating his radio, he called the flight lead for extraction, "Super 44, this is Delta 33, ready for extraction."

There was no response. Immediately, the isolation force commander came on the net, "Delta 33, this is Romeo 36, both Super 44 and Super 48 are destroyed. Air extraction aborted!" At this point the members of Task Force Ranger knew that their fate had quickly changed. Instead, of looking forward to a successful mission and a quick flight back to the ISB, the force was faced with the loss of two highly trained crews and two of the most sophisticated aircraft in the special operations inventory. Additionally, the swarming enemy was beginning to mass and engage the small, isolated elements of the special operations force. Very quickly, the large volume of enemy small arms fire began to overwhelm the sophisticated, precision weapons of the special operations force.

Instinctively, all soldiers realized that they were about to face one of their toughest challenges.¹

Circling above the objective site, two special operations soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shugart, could see the situation unraveling. Learning that ground forces would not be able to secure the crash sites of Super 44 and Super 48, they unhesitatingly volunteered to be inserted to protect the critically wounded crew members. The tactical commander initially refused their request. Despite being well aware of the growing number of enemy personnel closing on the site, MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart continued to push their request. After their third request to be inserted, they received permission to perform their volunteer mission. Armed with only their sniper rifles and pistols, MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart fastroped near the crash site while under intense small arms fire.

Although quickly out numbered, they relentlessly fought their way through a maze of shanties and shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. After pulling the crew to safety, MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart formed a perimeter. Within this defensive perimeter, they placed themselves in the most vulnerable positions in an attempt to halt the enemy advance. As described in his Medal of Honor citation, "with the sheer number of enemy overwhelming their position, MSG Gordon turned his rifle and last five rounds of ammunition over to the wounded pilot and said, 'Good luck.' Then, armed only with his pistol, MSG Gordon continued to fight until he was fatally wounded. His actions saved the life of the pilot."²

As the actions of other soldiers who were assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment demonstrated on 3 and 4 October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, the heroic deeds of MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart were not isolated incidents. Acts of bravery and courage clearly showed that Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment were willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their fallen comrades. It is important to find out why this type of commitment and selfless service exists in the U.S. Army and in many of its elite units. Leaders of Army units should understand why certain practices motivate soldiers to commit acts of bravery and courage, and how conditions in some units foster these actions. The ability to generate such a high level of commitment and loyalty is one of the major challenges of leadership. Understanding why these behaviors and beliefs have prospered in units such as the 75th Ranger Regiment will help the leadership of the U.S. Army as it moves into the 21st Century and transforms itself into the Army After Next.

Thesis Statement

This research study examines what effect the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment has on the unit's leadership practices. In order to address this question, the study examines the following subordinate questions:

1. How does unit culture develop in an organization?
2. What effect does unit culture have on an organization?
3. How does unit culture affect an organization's leadership?
4. How did the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment develop?

Significance of the Study

This research study will result in a better understanding of the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment and how that unit culture effects leadership practices in the unit. This increased understanding of the unit culture will be useful for the leadership of the 75th Ranger Regiment and its subordinate battalions. Implementing the recommendations of this study will benefit the leaders of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Specifically, this study will improve the training of mid-level leaders in the regiment. This training will have a value-added effect since it will further empower junior leaders to make decisions that will improve overall organizational effectiveness. This study will also allow leaders in the regiment to make more informed decisions on how the 75th Ranger Regiment should select and develop potential leaders at all levels.

This research study will also be useful for students of U.S. Army leadership doctrine. Researchers can further analyze the objective information gathered from the research instrument that was administered to members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Researchers can gather similar data from other units and make comparisons. A comparative study would further develop the Army's understanding of unit culture and its affect on leadership practices.

Finally, this research study will also be useful for the senior leadership of the U.S. Army as it prepares to develop the Army After Next. As the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Major General Robert Scales, stated, "In the Army of the 21st Century, units will become smaller, units will become more specialized, and units will become more tightly bonded."³ The leadership of the U.S. Army can use lessons learned

about the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment to improve their understanding of unit culture in other elite or specialized units in the Army After Next concept.

Definitions

Artifacts. They are the lowest level of organizational culture. They are the visible organizational structures, processes, rituals, behaviors, and displays. They are the most apparent part of an organizational culture, but they are often the least understood.⁴

Basic Assumptions. As Edgar Schein admits, basic assumptions can be referred to as “basic values.”⁵ The basic or core values of an organization define the unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of an organization. They are the ultimate source for an organization’s espoused values and behavior. Basic assumptions may differ from espoused values in that people in an organization can agree to disagree on values. However, basic assumptions are so taken for granted that someone who does not hold them as true is automatically dismissed.⁶

Elite. As defined in *Webster’s New World Dictionary*, elite is “a highly valued and exceptional part of a group; distinctive or unique.”⁷ In this study, an elite unit is neither better nor worse than another unit. It is a unit that is perceived to possess exceptional qualities or characteristics that separate it from other units that are similar in size and capability.

Espoused Values. They reflect the goals, strategies, and philosophies of an organization.⁸ Values, as defined by *The American Heritage Dictionary*, are “principles, standards, or qualities considered worthwhile or desirable.”⁹ An individual’s or organization’s values define their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.¹⁰

Executive Leaders. For the purpose of this study, executive leaders are officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the rank of master sergeant to command sergeant major, who are Ranger course qualified and have at least six months of previous Ranger unit experience.

Mid-level leaders. For the purpose of this study, mid-level leaders are noncommissioned officers in the rank of sergeant to sergeant first class, who are Ranger course qualified and have at least six months of previous Ranger unit experience. Candidate leaders are sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who are newly assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and who have no previous Ranger unit experience.¹¹

Organizational or Unit Culture. As defined by Edgar Schein in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, organizational or unit culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group has learned as it has solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”¹² Fundamentally, this translates into three levels of culture: artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions.

Assumptions

This study identifies elements of organizational culture in a military unit. The study will use models originally designed to identify elements of organizational culture in business organizations. To use these models on military units, commonality between business and military organizations is assumed.

For instance, both business and military organizations use common measures of success. Business organizations measure profitability in terms of man-hours trained, equipment readiness rates, and personnel efficiency. Likewise, military units report their mission readiness rates using similar measures. Also, business and military organizations strive for consumer approval and public support, respectively. And, both types of organizations are concerned with maintaining some level of worker satisfaction.

Additionally, both military and business organizations are faced with similar challenges. Both are constrained by limited resources. It is also generally accepted that both military and business organizations are facing a future of ever-increasing complexity and uncertainty.¹³

This study assumes that by definition, the 75th Ranger Regiment is an elite organization. This does not mean that the 75th Ranger Regiment is either better or worse than other conventional or special operations units of similar size and capability. As an elite organization, the 75th Ranger Regiment is a highly valued unit, which provides unique, one-of-a-kind capabilities to the U.S. Army.

Finally, this study assumes that there is no significant difference between each of the three battalions within the 75th Ranger Regiment. Each battalion is about the same size and has the same missions. The leaders of each of the battalions have similar backgrounds and experiences. The soldiers of each of the battalions receive the same initial training prior to reporting to their specific unit.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study only examines the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment and how that unit culture effects the 75th Ranger Regiment's leadership practices. The study will not compare or contrast this unit's culture with that of any other conventional or special operations unit.

The study uses information from a survey given to two groups within the 75th Ranger Regiment. First, the study addresses survey information from executive leaders: officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the rank of master sergeant to command sergeant major, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience. Second, the study addresses survey information from mid-level leaders: noncommissioned officers in the rank of sergeant to sergeant first class, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience. The study does not address survey information from leaders who are categorized as candidate leaders. These are sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who are newly assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and who have no previous Ranger unit experience.¹⁴

¹ This vignette basically parallels the events leading up to the climatic Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 and 4 October 1993. Aspects of the mission are still classified and have been generalized for this paper. Although MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart were not assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment, their actions are used in this vignette because they are the most publicized acts of heroism from Task Force Ranger. Their actions also fairly represent the heroic acts of many of the other soldiers who served on the task force.

² George Lang, Raymond L. Collins, and Gerard F. White, *Medal of Honor Recipients 1863-1994* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1994), p. 761.

³ Robert Scales, "The Twenty-First Century and the Army After Next." Speech delivered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 28 January 1998.

⁴ Ibid., p. 12-19.

⁵ Schein, p.16.

⁶ Ibid., p.12-27.

⁷ David B. Guralnik, *Webster's New World Dictionary* (New York: Fawcett Popular Library, 1979), p.199.

⁸ Ibid., p. 12-21.

⁹ William Morris, Ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 1414.

¹⁰ Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100(Draft), *Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 April 1997), p. 4-1.

¹¹ This concept of subcultures in the 75th Ranger Regiment was developed by Francis Kearney in his U.S. Army War College Research Project, "The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study." His development of subcultures was based upon Edgar Schein's article "Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning," *Sloan Management Review* 38, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 13-15.

¹² Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), p. 12.

¹³ Schein, p.1-12.

¹⁴ Kearney, p. 13-15.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research study examines how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment effects leadership practices in the unit. The study addresses the subordinate issues of: (1) How does unit culture develop in an organization? (2) What effect does unit culture have on an organization? (3) How does unit culture affect an organization's leadership? and (4) How did the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture develop?

This chapter presents a review of the literature related to the study of unit culture and its effect on the leadership practices of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The literature for this study basically fell into two broad categories: that which pertained to leadership and organizational culture; and that which pertained to the 75th Ranger Regiment.

There is an extremely large amount of research and written material that discusses leadership and organizational culture. Since the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of unit culture on a unit's leadership practices, the study relied upon several recent projects conducted to study the effect of organizational culture on business practices. Tom Peters and Robert Waterman released a study in 1982 in their popular book, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies*. John Kotter and James Heskett published a study in 1992 in *Corporate Culture and Performance*. James Collins and Jerry Porras completed a similar study in 1992 in *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*. From these studies, common references that the authors relied upon for their research were identified. The success of these studies and the

commonality of their base references gave a source of authoritative references for research on leadership and organizational culture.

Material about the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment is less readily available. Francis Kearney's research study on *The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study* provides an excellent discussion of the Regiment's unit culture. Additionally, *Raiders or Elite Infantry?* by David W. Hogan and *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* by Susan Marquis both present an accurate and current depiction of the 75th Ranger Regiment and other elite special operations units as they exist today.

The history of the 75th Ranger Regiment is well documented and has been the focus of detailed analysis. *Darby's Rangers, We Led the Way* by William O. Darby and William Baumer, and *Rangers in Korea* by Robert Black present an excellent overview of the history of ranger units in the past century. *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* by Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Ross, and Caleb Baker, and *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause* by Edward Flanagan present a detailed discussion of the 75th Ranger Regiment during the last operation in which the entire unit was engaged in combat operations. From this historical information, this study inferred how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment has developed.

The literature review in this chapter begins with a chronological review of significant studies on organizational effectiveness and how they progressed to an understanding of organizational culture and its role in organizational effectiveness. The review then analyzes the literature as it pertains to the secondary research questions: How

does unit culture develop in an organization? What effect does unit culture have on an organization? How does unit culture effect an organization's leadership? And how did the 75th Ranger Regiment's culture develop?

Evolution of the Study of Culture

Much of the current understanding of how organizations function stems from the work of Frederick Taylor over a century ago. His book, *The Scientific Management*, is a collection of his efforts. Taylor demonstrated that productivity in the work place was the result of applying resources unique to the human: knowledge and effort.¹ Taylor's approach to studying an organization relied heavily upon the examination of the task and of the worker employed to complete the task. Taylor stated that the way to get more output was to work smarter using proven solution strategies based on research and experimentation.² Taylor provided objective-based assessments to determine the most efficient manner to complete tasks. He also developed objective-based assessments to determine the benefits derived from motivational tools.³ One of his most important conclusions was that "the productivity of work is not the responsibility of the worker but of the manager."⁴ This conclusion served as the foundation for further studies into the effect managers and leaders have on an organization.

For instance, in his 1962 work, *Strategy and Structure*, Alfred Chandler continued the objective-based assessments of Taylor. Chandler identified key developments in business strategy and organization in major American corporations from 1850 to 1960. Chandler concluded that organizational structure followed from the organization's

strategy.⁵ In essence, a manager's ability to detect external change and develop a strategy to react to that change resulted in a change to the organization and its effectiveness.

Chandler noted that successful businesses that he studied had some common characteristics. First, the companies were able to detect changes in their environment, such as the opportunity for growth or advances in technology. Next, after identifying external changes, they were able to translate these changes into a strategy for their organization. This adjustment in strategy normally resulted in an adaptation of the organizational structure of the company.⁶ Chandler had taken Taylor's belief that managers were responsible for productivity one step further. No longer did the manager only affect the organization by manipulating the internal environment of the worker; now the manager's ability to detect external change and develop a strategy to react to that change were critical to the organization. Chandler's efforts reinforced a "multi-directional" perspective of studying and thus understanding organizational effectiveness.

Up to this point, much of Taylor and Chandler's work relied heavily upon an objective, scientific approach to the understanding of tangible factors that could be measured and observed in business organizations. However, Peter F. Drucker's work in 1974, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices*, established a study of not only objective factors such as time, capital, and natural resources, but also of knowledge.⁷ Drucker believed that "knowledge" for the business organization translated into a strategy and a mission. He observed that without insight into and understanding of a corporate mission and subsequent objectives, then managers could not manage.⁸ Drucker confirmed

what Taylor and Chandler had established. It was the manager's ability to manage that influenced organizational effectiveness the most.

Although a majority of Drucker's work in *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* and his following book in 1980, *Managing in Turbulent Times*, focused on economic effects and results, his establishment of the importance of a corporate 'knowledge', a mission and subsequent objectives, was paramount for following studies. Drucker's work expanded the scope by which future researchers could address problems in organizational effectiveness.

One of the studies which stemmed from Drucker's work was the research Tom Peters and Robert Waterman completed for their book, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies*. Early in 1977, Peters and Waterman headed a task force at McKinsey & Company to address "a general concern with the problem of management effectiveness, and a particular concern with the nature of the relationship between strategy, structure, and management effectiveness."⁹ Peters states that they "were uncomfortable with the limitations of the usual structural solutions."¹⁰ Their efforts led to the construction of the McKinsey 7-S Model.

The McKinsey 7-S Model offered a new analytical technique for researchers and managers to diagnose organizational effectiveness. The model demonstrates that organizational change is not simply a matter of structure, or the interaction of structure and strategy. Instead, effective organizational change is the interaction of seven elements: structure, systems, strategy, staff, style, skills, and shared values. Using a semi-structured interview instrument designed around the McKinsey 7-S Model, Peters

and Waterman gathered data on the organizational effectiveness of hundreds of the nation's leading businesses.

At about the same time, John Kotter conducted his research for *General Managers*. This study again took on complex issues beyond the interaction of strategy and structure. For a five year period he studied multiple variables related to managerial behavior. Kotter concluded that the managers who create successful change must be multi-faceted. These successful managers must possess the leader's skills and strategy to see and implement a vision, the outsider's perspective to integrate structures and staffs, and the insider's resources to balance systems and organizational styles.¹¹

Works, such as Peters and Waterman's, and Kotter's, established the complex nature of understanding organizational effectiveness and its many elements. But neither study initially attempted to organize those elements into a single concept or phenomena. Edgar Schein accomplished this in his first edition of *Organizational Culture and Leadership* in 1985. Schein organized these elements into the concept of organizational culture. Writing about many of the same fundamental ideas described by Peters and Waterman, and Kotter, Schein developed the concept of organizational culture so that leaders had "something that they could manipulate to create a more effective organization."¹²

Schein's model for organizational culture (artifacts, espoused values, and basic assumptions) is the foundation for many of the other studies that were released after 1985. Works, such as John Kotter and James Heskett's *Corporate Culture and Performance* and James Collins and Jerry Porras' *Built to Last: Successful Habits of*

Visionary Companies, validate Schein's concept. Both of these works positively demonstrate how ideas such as core values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors form a culture and that culture directly effects the organization's effectiveness.

With an understanding how researchers developed the concept of organizational culture, one can now look at how culture develops in an organization.

How Does Unit Culture Develop in an Organization?

A culture is established when a collection of people forms together as a group, rather than a crowd, and there is enough of a shared history or experience so that some degree of regular interaction is occurring within the group.¹³ A group does not form spontaneously or accidentally. Instead, the group is goal oriented, and is created because someone perceived that the coordinated effort of the group could accomplish more than individual action.¹⁴ As Schein defined earlier, a culture begins with a pattern of shared basic assumptions that are learned as the group solves problems in an effort to reach its common purpose.¹⁵

One encounters organizational cultures all the time. When a culture is alien to someone, its most visible qualities seem shocking. When a culture is one's own, it often goes unnoticed; until one tries to implement a new program or strategy that is incompatible with the basic assumptions and espoused values of the culture. It is at this point that one observes the power of culture first hand.¹⁶

In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Edgar Schein explains that this power of culture flows from three sources: (1) the beliefs, values, and assumptions of founders and leaders of an organization, (2) the learning experiences of group members as the

organization evolves, and (3) new beliefs, values, and assumptions brought in by new members and leaders.¹⁷ But of the three, Schein clearly believes that it is the organization's founders and leaders who determine how a culture is developed in an organization.¹⁸

Schein believes that it is the leader who shapes the culture, since it is the leader who proposes the initial answers to problems the group may face. The group can not test potential solutions if nothing is proposed. Inaction will result and there will be no shared history or experience. Once the leader activates the group, strong group members can propose other solutions, and the cultural learning process expands. However, it is still the values and beliefs established by the leader that temper the group's assumptions, beliefs and values.¹⁹

In *In Search of Excellence*, Peters and Waterman support Schein's assertion that leaders direct how culture develops in an organization. They state that the leader not only drives the formation of intangible values, beliefs, and ideas of the organization, but that the leader builds the tangible symbols, language, rituals, and structure of the organization. In fact, these tangible effects of culture may have the greatest initial influence on initiating action in a group.²⁰ As Peters and Waterman conclude, in an organization, often "it's the imagery that creates the understanding."²¹

But as Kotter and Heskett point out in *Corporate Culture and Performance*, the establishment and perpetuation of culture must go beyond the scope of the leader. At some point, the behavior and strategy of the organizational leader does not constitute a culture unless most group members actively follow those practices.²² In essence, it is the

organization and its behaviors, rituals, and structures that have the largest sustaining effect in shaping the organization's own culture of behaviors, beliefs, values, and assumptions.

This is not to say that the organization's culture reaches a state of being static. As Kotter and Heskett point out, "cultures can be very stable over time, but they are never static."²³ Crises force an organization to reevaluate their values or practices. But it is the organization's behaviors, beliefs, and values that will shape that reevaluation.

Drucker supports this idea of 'inclusiveness' in how organizational cultures are formed. In *Managing in Turbulent Times*, he explains how all organizational actions effect a given process, and it is the leader's responsibility to not only direct internal actions but to understand how external actions affect the process too.²⁴

Thus, to understand how an organization develops a unit culture, one must understand and accept the existence of culture in groups that possess a stated purpose. Unit culture is developed through the constant internal and external interaction of the group with itself and its environment.

What Effect Does Unit Culture Have on an Organization?

Understanding how unit culture is developed in an organization greatly facilitates understanding what effect that culture has on the organization. Just as the internal and external interaction of an organization with itself and its environment results in the development of the organization's culture, the action of developing the culture has a reciprocal effect on the organization. A perpetual cause-and-effect exchange results between the organization and its culture.

As Schein notes in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, “culture is pervasive and ultimately embraces everything that a group is concerned about and must deal with.”²⁵ Kotter and Heskett reach a similar conclusion in *Corporate Culture and Performance*, “culture represents an interdependent set of values and ways of behaving that are common in a community and that tend to perpetuate themselves.”²⁶ As these and other authors, such as Peters and Waterman, and Collins and Porras, conclude, culture effects almost every aspect of an organization.

Culture effects every physical aspect of an organization from the design of offices, to the manner of dress and language used. It effects intangible aspects of an organization such as ceremonies, implicit standards of behavior, and ideological principles that guide group action. Most importantly, culture effects an organization’s climate, habit of thinking, and shared values.

Culture may also have many negative effects on an organization. As Kotter and Heskett noted in *Corporate Culture and Performance*, culture can have two devastating effects on an organization. First, a culture can blind an organization to facts that do not match its basic assumptions. Second, an entrenched culture can make implementing a new strategy very difficult.²⁷ Remembering that the culture and the organization are in a perpetual, reciprocal exchange, it is easy to understand how culture can cause these results. It is as if the very successes of the organization, the shared experiences and values, could result in an organization that is inward looking and stifling of initiative.

Schein reaches the same conclusion in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. He writes that at some point “culture becomes more of a cause than an effect.”²⁸ The

organization's culture becomes a powerful influence on members' perceptions and pre-dispositions and serves an important anxiety reducing function. 'Blindly perpetuating itself,' the culture becomes dysfunctional.

To prevent this harmful result, an organization's culture should have a learning or adaptive effect on the organization. In *Corporate Culture and Performance*, Kotter and Heskett state that only cultures that can help organizations anticipate and adapt to change will result in success. They note that non-adaptive cultures are usually very bureaucratic; people are reactive, risk averse, and not very creative; a widespread emphasis on control dampens motivation and initiative. Kotter and Heskett conclude that in adaptive cultures, organizations should initiate change whenever necessary to satisfy the legitimate interests of the organization.²⁹

In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Schein reaches a similar conclusion. He states that organizations and their members will have to be perpetual learners. To build this culture of learning or adaptation, first, members must be careful to look inside themselves to locate their own assumptions and mental models before they take action.³⁰ But Schein also points out that the idea of a learning culture presents a paradox. He explains that culture is a stabilizer, a conservative force, and a way of making things predictable. But does this mean that culture is then itself increasingly dysfunctional? Can an organization stabilize perpetual learning and change?³¹

Schein asserts that this learning culture is a possibility. But to have a culture that is learning oriented, adaptive, and innovative, certain assumptions must be made. From Schein's work, it can be summarized that a learning culture must assume: (1) that the

world can be managed, (2) that it is appropriate for humans to be proactive problem solvers, (3) that reality and truth must be pragmatically discovered, (4) that both authoritarian and participative systems are appropriate provided they are based on trust, and (5) that human nature is basically good and in any case mutable.³²

In *In Search of Excellence*, Peters and Waterman attempt to answer this paradox with their eighth and final “basic truth” of excellent management practices: a culture with simultaneous loose-tight properties. This is in essence the “coexistence of firm central direction and maximum individual autonomy.” Peters and Waterman explain that organizations with this adaptive culture are on the one hand rigidly controlled, yet at the same time insistent on autonomy, entrepreneurship, and innovation from everyone. They do this by promoting a system of values that reinforces these beliefs.³³

In *Built to Last*, Collins and Porras expand on this paradoxical idea. They assert that effective organizational cultures “do not oppress themselves with the ‘Tyranny of the OR’, which supports beliefs that ‘you can have change OR stability,’ ‘you can be conservative OR bold,’ ‘you can have creative autonomy OR consistency and control.’ Instead, these cultures live with the ‘Genius of the AND.’ This belief supports that ‘you can have ideological control AND operational autonomy,’ ‘you can have extremely tight culture AND ability to change, move, and adapt,’ ‘you can have a relatively fixed core ideology AND vigorous change and movement.’”³⁴ Collins and Porras conclude that if an organization is to succeed it must have an adaptive culture that professes that, “the organization is prepared to change *everything* except its basic beliefs and core values.”³⁵

In essence, to truly understand how an adaptive and learning culture effects an organization, one must also understand how the organization and its environment effect the culture. As Schein writes in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, if an organization is to have an adaptive culture to make informed strategic choices, it must understand its own strengths and weaknesses; however, this process of understanding is not without risk and problems.³⁶

First, the organization might not be ready to receive feedback about its culture. This issue has internal and external consequences. Internally, members of the organization may not want to know or be able to handle the insights into their own culture. Externally, members of the organization may not be aware of the manner in which they become vulnerable once information about their culture is available to others.³⁷

Secondly, as Schein explains, in an attempt to understand how culture effects an organization, there is the danger that the interpretation will be incorrect or so superficial that the deeper layers of the culture remain unknown.³⁸ In *Corporate Culture and Performance*, Kotter and Heskett support this when they write that they observed organizations that would implement hundreds of initiatives to institute a new vision or strategy, as long as the initiatives focused more on behavior rather than values.³⁹

To summarize, culture affects every aspect of an organization. A perpetual cause-and-effect exchange results between the organization and its culture. Culture provides equilibrium and stability to an organization and facilitates the making of decisions. However, that same level of cultural comfort can have a negative affect on an

organization as it may stifle change and blind organizations to facts that do not match its basic assumptions. Only a culture that allows an organization to anticipate and adapt to change will result in success for the organization.

How Does Unit Culture Affect an Organization's Leadership?

In understanding what effect unit culture has on an organization, it was established that the basic assumptions or values of organizational culture are the product of past successes. As a result, these basic assumptions or values are increasingly taken for granted and operate as filters for what is perceived and thought about in an organization. The danger is that changes will not be noticed or even if noticed, that the organization will not be able to adapt due to routines based on past successes. This brings one back to the role of the leader in the organization.

As Schein asserted earlier in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, the leader is the most important element in how a culture develops in an organization. The leader must know himself, have insight into his organizational culture, and be able to perceive his environment to keep the organization effective.⁴⁰ Schein concludes that the dynamic processes of culture and organizational effectiveness "are the essence of leadership and makes one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin."⁴¹

In *Corporate Culture and Performance*, Kotter and Heskett state that only cultures that can help organizations anticipate and adapt to change will result in success. They conclude that leaders in adaptive cultures should provide leadership to initiate change whenever necessary to satisfy the legitimate interests of the organization.⁴²

How Did the 75th Ranger Regiment's Culture Develop?

As defined earlier, an organization develops its culture through the collection of shared basic assumptions that are learned as the organization solves problems in an effort to reach its common purpose.⁴³ By this definition, the development of the 75th Ranger Regiment's organizational culture began in 1974. The Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams directed that two Ranger battalions would be formed. Many factors influenced the formation of these units. Characteristics from past ranger units and from special operations forces influenced the basic assumptions found in the Ranger battalions formed in 1974. The following section reviews some unique aspects of special operations forces and past ranger units. This information will facilitate an understanding of the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Special Operations Forces

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operation tactics and strategies to exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities.⁴⁴ The history of U.S. special operations forces is marked by extremes of rapid buildup and then near elimination.⁴⁵ Current joint doctrine in FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defines special operations forces as:

Specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces formed to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These forces conduct operations during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces.⁴⁶

Military leaders, both civilian and uniformed, clearly understand the value of conventional military assets such as a tank battalion, a bomber wing, or an aircraft carrier

battle group. However, they find it more difficult to measure the value of a special operations force that conducts most of its operations in peacetime, under cover, or behind enemy lines.⁴⁷

Additionally, the American society has often rejected the notion of a special or possibly privileged group. Reflecting the society from which it came, the military has been traditionally distrustful of anything special or elite. However, this label is inevitable for units that have an attrition rate of 50 percent to 80 percent in their initial training programs.⁴⁸

Today's special operations forces consist of Navy SEALs; Air Force special operations aircrews and Special Tactics Groups; and Army Special Forces, Ranger, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. All special operations forces operate under the control of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM is one of the nine unified commands in the military's combatant command structure and exists to support regional combatant commanders, ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies.⁴⁹ The Marine Corps Commandant has designated some units, such as Marine Force Recon and some Marine Expeditionary Units as special operations capable. By the definition used in this study, these are elite organizations. However, they are not formally part of the special operations force of the U.S. armed forces.

All special operations personnel are volunteers. They come from diverse backgrounds, but they all have mutually supporting goals that they desire to accomplish. Special operations personnel are versatile, highly trained, and specially selected

professionals capable of surgically precise penetration-and-strike operations, as well as influencing, advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations. Special operations personnel demonstrate a high degree of self-confidence, physical and mental endurance, and stability under extreme stress. Above all, they understand the broad context in which their unique skills are to be employed. They understand the importance of acting with discretion and discipline.

Special operations units place a premium on personnel who are mature, high caliber professionals with intelligence, stamina, problem-solving skills, mental toughness, flexibility, determination, integrity, and extraordinary strength of character and will. Special operations personnel undergo intense training that ranks them among the nation's consummate military professionals. This process includes specialized training relevant to their missions, regular training with conventional forces, and constant training with other special operations components.

The 75th Ranger Regiment

Since the inception of the modern Ranger force in 1974, Rangers have stood at the forefront of the military's infantry force and are an important part of the military's special operations force. The hallmarks of the 75th Ranger Regiment are the discipline and esprit of its soldiers. The Regiment derives its heritage from a heroic past. From the Revolutionary War legacy of Robert Rogers's Rangers, to the World War II exploits of Merrill's Marauders and Darby's Rangers, the Regiment has had an illustrious past upon which to build.

The Ranger heritage began in the American colonial days when hardy, seasoned woodsmen, skilled in fieldcraft, "ranged" the frontiers for survival; hence their designation as "rangers." These men tended to be fiercely independent. It took a leader of strong character to assemble a group of men with these characteristics. It is not surprising that these early units drew much of their identity from the character and qualities of their commanders: charisma, courage, presence of mind, skill in fieldcraft, and physical strength.⁵⁰ Formalization of Ranger units began when Major Robert Rogers "organized and trained nine companies of American Colonists in 1756 during the French and Indian Wars."⁵¹ During the American Revolution, units, such as the one formed by Colonel Daniel Morgan, conducted quick raids to achieve tactical victory over more unwieldy British formations. The most famous Ranger unit during the Civil War was Mosby's Rangers. Led by Colonel John S. Mosby, this unit was very successful in raiding Union supply trains behind enemy lines.⁵²

During World War II, six Ranger Battalions were formed for operations in the European and Pacific Theaters. The 1st Ranger Battalion was formed under Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby, who later commanded all Ranger forces in the European Theater. Additionally, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly known as Merrill's Marauders, was activated in the China-Burma-India Theater. Under the command of Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, they conducted deep infiltrations to raid key Japanese sites. All totaled, the Ranger units in World War II took part in twenty-six major battles and spearheaded seven invasions.⁵³

It was during the World War II period that Ranger units began to conduct special training that separated them from conventional forces. Ranger volunteers were trained extensively on hand-to-hand combat and night infiltration techniques. They also received training that was unique to the theater of war that they would operate in.

During the Korean War, a total of fourteen Ranger companies were formed and attached to infantry divisions. As during World War II, these companies consisted only of volunteers. Though not normally used in traditional Ranger operations, these companies fought with distinction and earned numerous unit citations.⁵⁴

As in World War II, Ranger units during this period, conducted special training. Training consisted of amphibious and airborne operations, demolitions and close combat. Physical conditioning and foot marching were constant. Every company was expected to move 40-50 miles, cross-country, in 18 hours. Additionally, qualified individuals were authorized to wear distinctive insignia such as the Ranger Tab.

During the Vietnam War, several "Ranger" units were activated. The primary mission of these company-sized units was long-range reconnaissance and the gathering of intelligence for the supported combat divisions. Their organizational structure closely resembled the structure of today's Special Forces teams.⁵⁵ Although they did not resemble their Ranger predecessors in Korea and World War II, they were still given the designation of "Rangers."

In the fall of 1973, General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, directed the formation of the first battalion-sized Ranger units since World War II. He felt a tough, disciplined and elite Ranger unit would set a standard for the rest of the United States

Army and that, as Rangers “graduated” from Ranger units to Regular Army units, their influence would improve the entire Army.⁵⁶ Specifically, General Abrams directed:

The Ranger Battalion is to be an elite, light, and the most proficient infantry battalion in the world; a battalion that can do things with its hands and weapons better than anyone. The Battalion will contain no ‘hoodlums’ or ‘brigands’ and that if the battalion were formed of such, it would be disbanded... wherever the Ranger Battalion goes, it is apparent that it is the best.⁵⁷

On 25 January 1974, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command, published General Orders 127, directing the activation of the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), with an effective date of 31 January 1974. The 2nd Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) soon followed with activation on 1 October 1974. Each unit eventually established headquarters at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, and Fort Lewis, Washington, respectively.⁵⁸

During this period, the initial leadership of these two battalions began forming the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment. As with earlier units, Rangers conducted special training and were authorized to wear distinctive insignia, such as the Ranger Scroll, Ranger Tab, and Black Beret. Additionally, the unit was no longer composed simply of volunteers; now these volunteers had to pass a rigorous, physical entry test. General Abram’s Charter defined the purpose of the two Ranger battalions (see appendix B). At this time the unit also instituted the Ranger Creed (see appendix A). This creed would nurture the core values and ideology of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The modern Ranger Battalions were first called to action when elements of 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) participated in the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt. This operation laid the groundwork for the U.S. special operations capability of today.

Rangers and other special operations forces from throughout the Department of Defense developed tactics, techniques, and equipment from scratch, as no doctrine existed for special operation forces at the time.

The Ranger battalions proved their combat effectiveness during the United States' deployment on 25 October 1983, to Grenada. The mission of the Rangers was to protect the lives of American citizens and restore democracy to the island. During Operation URGENT FURY, the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions conducted a daring low-level parachute assault, seized the airfield at Point Salinas, rescued American citizens at the True Blue Medical Campus, and conducted air assault operations to eliminate pockets of resistance.

As a result of the demonstrated effectiveness of the Ranger battalions, the Department of the Army announced in 1984 that it was increasing the size of the active duty Ranger force to its highest level in forty years by activating another Ranger battalion and a Ranger Regimental Headquarters. These new units, the 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger), received their colors on 3 October 1984, at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The entire Ranger Regiment participated in Operation JUST CAUSE, in which U.S. forces restored democracy to Panama. Rangers spearheaded the action by conducting two important operations. The 1st Battalion, reinforced by Company C, 3rd Battalion, and a Regimental Command and Control Team, conducted a parachute assault onto Torrijos/ Tocumen International Airport, to neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces(PDF). The 2nd and 3rd Ranger Battalions and a Regimental Command and

Control Team, conducted a parachute assault onto the airfield at Rio Hato, to neutralize the PDF and seize General Manuel Noriega's beach house. Following the successful completion of these assaults, Rangers conducted follow-on operations in support of Joint Task Force(JTF)-South.

Elements of 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation DESERT STORM. The Rangers conducted raids and provided a quick reaction force in cooperation with Coalition forces. Most recently elements of 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment deployed to Somalia and elements of 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment participated in actions in Haiti. The performance of these Ranger units significantly contributed to the overall success of these operations, and upheld the proud Ranger traditions of the past.

As with earlier Ranger units, the 75th Ranger Regiment still conducts special training and is authorized to wear distinctive insignia, such as the Ranger Scroll, Ranger Tab, and Black Beret. Additionally, the unit is still composed solely of volunteers. Now these volunteers must not only pass a rigorous, physical entry test; they must also complete an assessment program that includes a stringent psychological evaluation for all Ranger leaders. During in processing to the unit, new Rangers receive training on the Ranger Creed, and are briefed on the values of the unit and the Regimental Commander's vision for the future.

The Culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment

In order to analyze the effect of unit culture on leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment, one must understand some major elements of the regiment's culture.

This study uses Schein's framework of organizational culture: artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions to describe the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Francis Kearney outlined many of these elements in his study, *The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study*. Additionally, the background information on special operation forces and ranger units in the previous section of this chapter assists in developing an understanding of many aspects of the regiment's culture.

Artifacts

As noted earlier, the 75th Ranger Regiment is stationed at three different locations: Fort Benning, Georgia; Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; and Fort Lewis, Washington. At each of these locations there are common elements that are artifacts of the regiment's culture. First, as one approaches each Ranger compound, one is impressed by the high security fence and barbed wire that surrounds the entire compound.⁵⁹ Upon entering one will pass under a large, highly visible Ranger scroll. This distinctive sign represents the unique shoulder insignia worn only by members of the unit. Within the compound one will notice the close proximity of a large physical training area with towers, climbing ropes, and sawdust pits. The Rangers encountered wear high and tight haircuts, distinctive black berets, starched camouflaged uniforms, and highly spit shined jungle boots.

Upon reaching the headquarters building, one observes a bronze plaque naming the building after a former Ranger who exemplified the values of the unit. A Ranger, who will challenge the presence of all visitors with stern and courtesy greeting, meets

anyone who enters the headquarters building. Whenever an officer approaches every Ranger salutes sharply and sounds off with "Rangers lead the way, sir!" with all officers enthusiastically responding "All the way!" One hears Rangers addressing each other as Private, Specialist, Sergeant or sir. Their discipline and the unit hierarchy are clearly apparent.

Throughout the unit area, one finds monuments, plaques, pictures, and conference rooms honoring fellow Rangers who were killed in training or combat. One finds plaques honoring Soldiers and NCOs of the Month and Quarter, and trophies honoring units who have won various athletic competitions. The unit has decorated its hallways with numerous paintings and photos that depict the history of the regiment in combat and in training. One clearly gains the sense that sacrifice, giving one's complete effort, and remembering fallen comrades is a way of life.

As one spends more time with the 75th Ranger Regiment, one will observe unique rituals. First, each day begins with a demanding session of physical training. This physical training is different from that performed by the rest of the Army. All Rangers will be outfitted in unique, all black P.T. uniforms with the distinctive unit scroll on it. Rangers will usually conduct physical training at the squad level. This demonstrates a trust in the junior leaders' ability to perform this important event to standard. All Rangers, regardless of age or position, will be required to train to the same high standard.

Often at the beginning or end of physical training, or at other special activities, one will observe another ritual, the recitation of the Ranger Creed. The Ranger Creed consists of six stanzas and 248 words. Every Ranger is required to memorize the Ranger

Creed prior to being assigned to the regiment. The Ranger Creed articulates many of the espoused values of the regiment. In reciting the Ranger Creed, one Ranger will come forward and lead the rest of the formation in reciting a stanza. The Ranger Creed is part of every event that requires moral strength, courage, and unity of purpose. Observing a battalion or the entire regiment recite the Ranger Creed provides an awesome awareness of the bond that exists between the Rangers.

Finally, one will observe that a large number of Rangers dip tobacco, cuss, and communicate forcefully with each other. Rangers complete every action with an intense sense of purpose.⁶⁰

Espoused Values

As noted earlier, the Ranger Creed articulates many of the espoused values of the 75th Ranger Regiment (see appendix A). The creed proclaims: voluntary service, willful acceptance to hazards, and loyalty to unit; expected proficiency at the highest level of physical readiness, mental alertness, and moral courage; acknowledged elitism and rigorous training; loyalty to comrades and courtesy to superiors; unfailing commitment to victory and the courage to complete every mission even as the lone survivor.

As Francis Kearney, a former Ranger battalion commander outlined in *The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study*, the Ranger Creed embodies the espoused values of: “discipline, adherence to the highest standards, continual striving for excellence. Loyalty to fellow Rangers, unit, and country, mental toughness, and an indomitable will to accomplish the mission whatever the circumstances.”⁶¹

Additional espoused values are found in "Abrams' Charter" and subsequent charters from other Chiefs of Staff of the Army (see appendices B - D). Among them are the beliefs: that realistic, live-fire training is the best way to maintain combat readiness; that the successful completion of Ranger school is critical for leader development and validation of Ranger skills; that miscreants and discipline problems will not be tolerated; that the Regiment is the best place to serve, but Ranger leaders should return to the Army to impart the standards they have learned while in the Regiment.⁶²

Command philosophies and letters of guidance from commanders of the 75th Ranger Regiment have consistently listed important, espoused values. For instance, the importance of individual physical readiness. All Rangers must exceed common Army physical fitness standards, no matter what their age or duty position. Also, integrity and honesty are sacred and nonnegotiable. The pace and criticality of operations make it impossible for Rangers to question the words, actions, or intentions of their fellow Rangers.⁶³

Basic Assumptions

Within the 75th Ranger Regiment certain shared beliefs and experiences have repeatedly brought success to the unit. These beliefs and experiences have become basic assumptions accepted by the unit.

The first basic assumption is that if a Ranger fails to perform to an established standard, whether it be physical, moral, training, conduct, regulatory, or safety, then that Ranger will be expelled from the regiment. During their inception in the 1970s, the Ranger battalions had unconditional relief authority. This authority was required to

rapidly form the Ranger battalions without spending extra resources and time on the less skilled volunteers or the unmotivated. Although the regiment now uses the Army's standard transfer and elimination procedure to accomplish this task, it has retained the practice of identifying and eliminating Rangers who do not perform to standard.

This assumption is especially prevalent when dealing with Ranger leaders. Ranger commanders and platoon leaders must have successfully served as commanders or platoon leaders in other infantry units prior to assuming duties in the regiment. When exceptions have been made, this has normally resulted in less than favorable circumstances, thus, reinforcing the basic assumption.⁶⁴

Another basic assumption is that self-discipline and mental toughness are absolutes for all Rangers. Within the regiment, Rangers take it for granted that fellow Rangers will possess intrinsic motivation and a relentless pursuit of excellence in all tasks. This is exemplified in the importance placed on a Ranger earning his Ranger Tab. Although not directly related to job performance, successful completion of the Ranger course is imperative for all Rangers who desire to stay in the regiment. More of a test of discipline and will power under adverse conditions, completion of the Ranger course demonstrates a level of toughness viewed as necessary in the regiment. Failure to pass the Ranger course is an embarrassment and normally results in immediate reassignment out of the regiment.⁶⁵

Another basic assumption is that a highly stressful and often antagonistic environment produces positive results. The application of stress, whether through extra physical training or demanding training scenarios, is an acceptable motivational

technique. This is seen in the standards for collective training conducted across the regiment. Exercises and training events are realistic and demanding, and replicate the stress of combat.

This climate spills over into the socialization process within the regiment. Ranger candidates must complete the demands of a three-week Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP). Once in the regiment, new Rangers must continuously meet developmental requirements that will determine if the unit will retain the new Ranger. This stressful socialization process will continue until the new ranger completes the Ranger course and earns his Ranger Tab. Even when an experienced Ranger returns to the regiment, he must complete the standard accession requirements in the two-week Ranger Assessment and Selection Program. If the Ranger fails this program, he is not assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and is open for worldwide reassignment.⁶⁶

This is not an all-inclusive list of artifacts, espoused values, and basic assumptions. However, it represents a clear framework of the culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment and now allows the study to look at the effect that the unit culture has on leadership practices.

Summary

This chapter reviewed existing literature on the subject of unit culture and the culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment. This literature was able to address the subordinate research questions of: (1) How does unit culture develop in an organization? (2) What effect does unit culture have on an organization? (3) How does unit culture effect an

organization's leadership? and (4) How did the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture develop?

The review began by tracing the process of organizational analysis from the works of Taylor and Chandler, through Drucker and Schein, to the studies of Peters and Waterman, Kotter and Heskett, and Collins and Porras. It was shown that culture is developed through the constant internal and external interaction of the group with itself and its environment, and that culture effects every aspect of an organization. It was concluded that only cultures that can help organizations anticipate and adapt to change will result in success, and to have an adaptive culture, leaders must be perpetual learners. But this process of learning is not without risk; in an attempt to understand how culture effects an organization, there is the danger that the interpretation may be incorrect or so superficial that the deeper layers of the culture remain unknown and unchanged.

The culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment was then discussed using Schein's framework of artifacts, espoused values and basic assumptions. The culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment has three basic assumptions: that all Rangers must perform to standard or be expelled; that self-discipline and mental toughness are absolutes for all Rangers; and that a highly stressful environment produces positive results. In the next step, the study will attempt to determine what effect the culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment has on leadership practices in the unit.

¹ Peter F. Drucker, *Managing in Turbulent Times* (New York: Harper & Row, Press, 1980), p. 15.

² George M. Coggins, *Excellence in the Military* (Doctorate Dissertation, School of Business and Management, United States International University), p. 15.

³ Frederick Taylor, *The Scientific Management* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911), p. 182-193.

⁴ Drucker, p. 15.

⁵ Alfred D. Chandler, *Strategy and Structure* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), p. 147-155.

⁶ Chandler, p. 118-128.

⁷ Peter F. Drucker, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 118-189.

⁸ Coggins, p. 19.

⁹ Peters and Waterman, p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹ John Kotter and James Heskett summarize this point from Kotter's book, *General Managers* in their follow-on book, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p.91.

¹² Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), p. xi.

¹³ Schein, p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 211-213.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.12.

¹⁶ Kotter and Heskett, p. 3-5.

¹⁷ Schein, p. 211.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 211-226.

²⁰ Peters and Waterman, p. 103-108.

²¹ Ibid., p. 105.

²² Kotter and Heskett, p.4-6.

²³ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁴ Drucker, *Managing in Turbulent Times*, p. 15-22.

²⁵ Schein, p. 49.

²⁶ Kotter and Heskett, p. 141.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 41-77.

²⁸ Schein, p. 377.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 28-57.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 361-373.

³¹ Ibid., p. 361.

³² Ibid., p. 372.

³³ Peters and Waterman, p. 318-325.

³⁴ James Collins and Jerry Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: Harper Business, 1992), p. 43-45.

³⁵ Ibid., p.43-91.

³⁶ Schein, p. 195.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 195-207.

³⁸ Ibid., p.195-207.

³⁹ Kotter and Heskett, p. 99.

⁴⁰ Schein, p. 379-386.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴² Ibid., p. 28-57.

⁴³ Ibid., p.12.

⁴⁴ Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Posture Statement 1994*, 1 October 1994, p. 3.

⁴⁵ Susan Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 4.

⁴⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, FM 101-5-1, 30 September 1997, p. 1-142.

⁴⁷ Marquis, p. 4-5.

⁴⁸ This topic is covered extensively in both Susan Marquis' *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*, p. 1-5 and David W. Hogan's, *Raiders or Elite Infantry*, p. ix-xx and p. 231-235.

⁴⁹ Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, *USSOCOM Posture Statement 1996*, 1 October 1996, p.1.

⁵⁰ Chelsea Y. Chea, *The Roles and Missions of Rangers in the Twenty-First Century* (Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), p.3.

⁵¹ David W. Hogan, Jr., *Raiders or Elite Infantry* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 19.

⁵² Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, *Rangers... Past and Present, Our Lineage and an Overview of the 75th Ranger Regiment*, undated, p. 7.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 9-18.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.19-21.

⁵⁵ Chea, p. 7-8.

⁵⁶ Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, p.25-26.

⁵⁷ Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, *Command Briefing*, 15 May 1997.

⁵⁸ The summary of the history of the 75th Ranger Regiment from 1974 to present was compiled from common knowledge of Ranger history, the 75th Ranger Regiment *Command Briefing*, and the 75th Ranger Regiment's Handbook *Rangers... Past and Present, Our Lineage and an Overview of the 75th Ranger Regiment*.

⁵⁹ Much of the discussion of the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment stems from the work of Francis H. Kearney, III, *The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study* (Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1997), p. 3. This project clearly outlined many of the unique aspects of the unit using Schein' model.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 6-9.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.6.

⁶² Ibid., p. 6-7.

⁶³ Command Philosophies

⁶⁴ Kearney, p. 9.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 9-10.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 9-11.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used in the study. Specifically, this study examines how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment effects leadership practices in the unit. The study addresses the subordinate issues of: (1) How does unit culture develop in an organization? (2) What effect does unit culture have on an organization? (3) How does unit culture effect an organization's leadership? and (4) How did the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture develop?

The literature review in the previous chapter focused on addressing the subordinate research questions. That chapter examined what many of the authors in the field of leadership and organizational effectiveness have said about unit culture, and how unit culture effects an organization and its leadership practices. Additionally, the written histories of the 75th Ranger Regiment described the 75th Ranger Regiment's overall unit culture and how that culture has developed throughout the unit's existence.

In order to develop a better understanding of how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment effects leadership practices in the unit, it is necessary to gather information directly from the leadership of the unit. The Army Research Institute, the Combined Arms Research Library, and the Evaluation and Standardization Division of the Directorate of Academic Affairs at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College had no record of previous research surveys conducted on the 75th Ranger Regiment or its leadership. To obtain this information, a research instrument was

developed, tested, and administered to selected leaders throughout the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Description of the Research Instrument

The purpose of the research instrument was to measure prevalent views on the effect unit culture has on leadership practices within the 75th Ranger Regiment. Due to the large sample size, instead of conducting interviews, the research instrument used was a written, rating-scale and open-end question survey. A representative sample of executive leaders and mid-level leaders within the 75th Ranger Regiment completed the survey questionnaire.

Structure

The survey questionnaire was structured using the McKinsey 7-S Model. As discussed in the literature review, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman developed the McKinsey 7-S Model during their research for the book *In Search of Excellence*.¹ Researchers and managers use the McKinsey 7-S Model as an analytical tool to diagnose an organization. The model shows that organizational change is the interaction of seven elements: structure, systems, strategy, staff, style, skills, and shared values. Peters and Waterman define these variables as:

1. Structure: organizational charts and other tools that show the chain of command and how tasks are assigned and integrated.
2. Systems: formal and informal, day-to-day procedures, reports, and processes that control the way things are accomplished.
3. Strategy: plans to sustain or improve resource utilization or position.

4. Staff: procedures through which organizational members are selected, trained, and evaluated.

5. Style: management's priorities as indicated by performance, time utilization, and behavior.

6. Skills: strengths, capabilities, and critical attributes as demonstrated by an organization.

7. Shared values: values shared by the majority of the members of the organization and basic concepts that guide the organizational goals and decision making process.²

Survey questions were developed for each of the seven variables of the McKinsey 7-S Model. Of the fifty questions on the survey, forty-seven were rating-scale questions and three were open-end questions. All three of the open-end questions allowed the respondents to provide further information on the preceding rating-scale question. The forty-seven rating-scale questions were divided among the seven variables of the McKinsey 7-S Model as follows: Nine questions addressed shared values, eight questions addressed staff, seven questions addressed strategy, six questions addressed structure, and five questions each addressed skills and style. The questions were placed randomly throughout the survey so that questions addressing a single variable were not answered consecutively and unintended response patterns were avoided. It is noted that the responses to many questions could be used to analyze more than one variable in the McKinsey 7-S Model.

The rating-scale questions used a five-point Lickert scale. The survey asked the respondents for their judgment on how strongly they agreed or disagreed with a particular topic. For the purpose of the survey, the choices were defined as follows:

Strongly Agree--Find the statement to be very suitable.

Agree--Find the statement to be generally suitable.

No Opinion--Do not have an opinion.

Disagree--Find the statement to be generally unsuitable.

Strongly Disagree--Find the statement to be very unsuitable.

The instructions, which were on the first page of the survey, contained these definitions. Respondents could refer back to these definitions at any time during the completion of the survey questionnaire.

Format

The survey questionnaire was six pages long and was printed on the front and back of three sheets of 8.5 by 11-inch paper (see appendix E). The respondents provided answers directly on the survey and did not have to complete a separate, mark-sense card.

The first page of the survey was the cover sheet with instructions and administrative data. The cover sheet stated the purpose of the survey, which was to identify unique aspects of the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture and their effect on leadership practices. The instructions directed respondents to circle one answer for each question and to feel free to add any comments that supported answers they provided.

The instructions directed respondents to not include their names. However, administrative data required respondents to include their rank, current duty position, current unit, and amount of time in current position. This demographic information was

used to categorize respondents as being executive leaders or mid-level leaders. The instructions also directed the respondents to list all other previous duty positions in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The first series of questions on the survey questionnaire addressed shared values and their effect on structures, strategies, systems, and style in the unit. These questions were non-threatening since they highlighted a positive aspect of the 75th Ranger Regiment--its shared values that are outlined in documents, such as the Ranger Creed, Abrams Charter, and command philosophies. These easier questions were placed in the beginning of the survey questionnaire to encourage respondents to continue with the remaining questions. Sensitive questions that dealt with possible, negative aspects of the unit's culture were placed later in the survey. Highly sensitive questions that may have dealt with issues of race, extremist organizations, and hazing were not included.

Validity of the Research Instrument

The validity of the research instrument is the extent to which it measures what it is supposed to measure.³ In the practical research process, there are many variants of validity. In developing this survey instrument as primarily a rating-scale questionnaire, content validity and construction validity were the most important areas of concern.

Content validity is the subjective judgment about a survey that determines whether its questions deal with the topic they are supposed to address.⁴ To establish content validity, the survey questionnaire was designed after two other research instruments that were built to determine elements of organizational culture using the McKinsey 7-S Model. The survey questionnaire closely followed the content of these two research instruments. The first research instrument was the *Organization and*

Innovation Survey Questionnaire developed by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman in 1980 for their research for *In Search of Excellence*. The second research instrument was an open-ended, semi-structured interview worksheet developed by George Coggins for his study, *Excellence in the Military: A Study of the United States Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Squadron Maintenance Departments*. Both of these research instruments measured factors of organizational culture using the seven variables of the McKinsey 7-S Model.

Content validity was further established through feedback from research committee members. The research committee members were all experts in the area of leadership and organizational effectiveness. All had previous military experience. The committee also had extensive experience in the use of various research instruments to include survey questionnaires. The final survey questionnaire incorporated the results of their feedback and was further reviewed for correctness and format.

Construct validity is established when the results of the survey are congruent with the concept behind the research study.⁵ Construct validity is a very subjective measure of validity. To establish construct validity, the wording of questions on the survey was derived from terminology that is consistent with the Army's doctrine on leadership and the theories of organizational culture as defined in reference works cited in the literature review in the previous chapter. Again, the research committee provided a large amount of feedback to insure construct validity.

Construct validity was also established through a pilot survey administered to fifteen United States Army officers. These officers had not been assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment, but were directed to answer the survey based on their experiences in

their last unit. Prior to completing the questionnaire, the pilot survey respondents were briefed on the purpose and methodology of the research study. They were also instructed on Schein's definition of unit culture and the McKinsey 7-S Model. Finally, they viewed the 75th Ranger Regiment Command Information brief and video. With this information, they were then asked to complete the questionnaire and address any points that they thought were not consistent with the study. This pilot survey resulted in five questions being corrected for grammatical or formatting errors.

Construct validity was further established by insuring that close-ended, rating-scale questions in each of the seven variable categories were answered consistently in the pilot survey. Consistency in this case was defined by the regularity that a respondent either "Agreed/Strongly Agreed" or "Disagreed/Strongly Disagreed" with all questions within each of the seven variable categories. A "No Opinion" response eliminated that category of questions for that particular respondent. Of the 705 possible closed-ended, rating-scale responses, thirty-three were not consistent with other answers to questions in the same variable category. This is a variance of less than 5 percent. Twenty-one of the thirty-three shifts from agreement to disagreement within the variable category were in the shared-values category. This result can be attributed to the fact that four of the questions in this category ask if shared values influence one of the other variables (structure, strategies, systems, and style). Nineteen of the twenty-one shifts in agreement to disagreement in the shared-values category involved those four questions.

Reliability of the Research Instrument

Reliability is the tendency to get the same results twice with the same measuring device.⁶ Reliability was established through the pilot survey, which was re-administered

to ten of the same fifteen United States Army officers who were noted earlier. Fifteen officers completed the questionnaire on a Friday. The following Monday, ten of those officers completed the survey again. These officers had not been assigned to 75th Ranger Regiment, but were directed to answer the survey questionnaire based on their experiences in their last unit. It was necessary to explain to them that they were taking the survey again in order to establish its reliability; this information may have resulted in some respondents trying to match their original answers. However, due to the length of the questionnaire, it is not feasible that they could have memorized all of their previous responses.

This pilot survey established reliability in that only eight responses out of 470 possible close-ended responses answered on Monday varied from the responses provided by each respondent on Friday. This is a variance of less than 2 percent. Additionally, none of the variances involved a shift in answers from agreement to disagreement on a particular question.

The pilot survey also established reliability for the process by which the data was input into the computer for analysis. For this survey questionnaire, one person input the data from the survey questionnaire into the computer spreadsheet. To insure reliability, the responses from the fifteen pilot survey questionnaires were input twice into separate spreadsheets. The only error occurred when the data from a close-ended, rating-scale question was input into the spreadsheet field of the previous open-ended question. This occurred because the respondent did not provide a response for the open-ended question and that field was not skipped during input. This error was easily noted at the end of the

survey questionnaire input process. All of the other 705 data entries was input properly; thus establishing reliability of the data input process.

Relevance of the Research Instrument

In order for respondents to provide meaningful feedback on the survey questionnaire, it was necessary to establish the relevance of the research instrument. This was first accomplished by clearly stating the purpose of the study in the cover sheet of the survey questionnaire. The cover sheet stated that the purpose of the survey was to identify unique aspects of the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture and their effect on leadership practices. As an organization, the 75th Ranger Regiment is dedicated to improving its leadership practices. This dedication is demonstrated in the unit's frequent climate surveys, its psychological evaluation of potential leaders, and its demanding selection requirements. Respondents understood that this survey questionnaire would support the improvement of leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Additionally, having the 75th Ranger Regiment administer the survey questionnaire adds to the relevance of the research instrument. Respondents understood that their responses would not be used by outside organizations to discredit the unit or its leaders. Instead, the information will support the improvement of leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Procedures for Collection of Data

The leadership within the 75th Ranger Regiment administered the survey questionnaire. After the research committee approved the survey instrument, and validity and reliability were established, the survey questionnaire was sent to the 75th Ranger Regiment. Major(P) Scott A. Henry, the Regimental S5 served as the point of contact for

the survey. He administered the questionnaire to leaders assigned to the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia. The survey questionnaires were completed in a two-week period while the unit was deployed on a Joint Readiness Training Exercise. This plan allowed all survey questionnaires to be completed at a single point in time for the unit's leadership. As the respondents completed the questionnaires, MAJ(P) Henry returned them through the mail.

Description of Respondents

The respondents chosen to participate in the survey represented the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 75th Ranger Regiment responsible for the daily execution of leadership tasks in the unit. Respondents fell into two categories. First, the study addresses survey information from executive leaders: officers and senior non-commissioned officers in the rank of Master Sergeant to Command Sergeant Major, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience. Second, the study addresses survey information from mid-level leaders: non-commissioned officers in the rank of Sergeant to Sergeant First Class, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience. The study does not address survey information from leaders who are categorized as candidates. These are Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains who are newly assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and who have no previous Ranger unit experience.⁷

As stated earlier, a representative sample of leaders assigned to the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia completed the survey questionnaire. Leaders from 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger

Regiment at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, and 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Lewis, Washington, did not complete the survey questionnaire due to their distance from the survey administrator, the Regimental S5, Major Scott Henry. As noted in Chapter One, it was assumed that there was no significant difference between each of the three battalions and that the leaders sampled from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, represented leaders across the other battalions.

Within the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, there are, at any given time, approximately 30 leaders who fall into the category of executive leaders. In accordance with the standards established in the *NEA Research Bulletin* for "Small-Sample Techniques," to gain a representative sample of this size population, the Regimental S5 administered the survey questionnaire to 30 officers and senior non-commissioned officers in the rank of Master Sergeant to Command Sergeant Major, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience.

Within the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment there are, at any given time, approximately 70 leaders who fall into the category of mid-level leaders. In accordance with the standards established in the *NEA Research Bulletin* for "Small-Sample Techniques," to gain a representative sample of this size population, the Regimental S5 administered the survey questionnaire to 65 non-commissioned officers in the rank of Sergeant to Sergeant First Class, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience.⁸

Procedure for Data Analysis

The questionnaire measured prevalent views on the effect unit culture has on leadership practices within the 75th Ranger Regiment. The respondents provided their judgment on how strongly they agreed or disagreed with a particular topic. Answers to the questionnaire were input into a computer spreadsheet program. Using the Microsoft EXCEL Spreadsheet program, responses were analyzed statistically to determine statistical trends within each category of respondent (executive or mid-level leaders) and within each of the variable categories of the McKinsey 7-S Model. If the respondents made any written comments, those comments were consolidated for future reference.

Since the questionnaire only measured prevalent views, using a rating-scale, the statistical trends will not reveal objective conclusions on the effect that unit culture has on leadership practices. The statistical results are indicators that will be analyzed in the next stage of the research study.

Statistical Analysis

The *Statistical Analysis Package for Microsoft EXCEL* was used to analyze the data obtained from the survey questionnaires. The recorded responses were transferred to a Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheet database. This database was converted to a system file that could be read and analyzed by the Microsoft EXCEL Statistical Analysis Package.

Microsoft EXCEL version 7.0 is an advanced spreadsheet product for IBM AT or PS/2 compatible computers that supports database manipulation and graphic functions. EXCEL is an example of a contextually integrated product. That is, it combines applications and functions that are frequently used in the same context by users whose primary task is analyzing and processing numerical data.⁹

For the statistical analysis, this study examines the data in two ways. First, demographic information will be analyzed. A comparison of responses will be made by category of respondent: executive leader or mid-level leader. Second, data will be analyzed within each of the seven variables of the McKinsey 7-S Model.

The chi-square test for non-parametric statistics was applied to responses within demographic groups. The chi-square test determines if there is any statistical difference between the responses of the demographic groups being compared for each of the questions within the seven categories. In order for there to be any significance, a chi-squared value of less than .05 must be achieved. This means that there is at least a 95 percent assurance that the results of a particular comparison did not occur by chance. Results that pass the chi-square test are analyzed for significance and appropriate recommendations are made.¹⁰

Data will be presented in tabular format. An example of this format is shown below:

Table # - Comparison of Question #							
“The question as found on the survey questionnaire.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Middle Management	65	100	0	0	0	0	65
Total	95		0		0		95
Chi-square = 22.25 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

Summary

This chapter explained the research methodology used in this project. Specifically, the chapter addressed the use of a fifty-question, rating-scale and open-ended survey questionnaire as the study's research instrument. The survey questionnaire was structured using the McKinsey 7-S Model to gather data on the shared values, structure, systems, strategy, staff, style, and skills within the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

This chapter concluded that the method of research is valid. The chapter outlined the format and structure of the research instrument. It discussed the validity, reliability, and relevance of the research instrument. It identified the data sources and described the selection process for respondents. It specified the development process of the survey questionnaire. Finally, it described the procedures in collecting and analyzing the data gathered from the survey questionnaire.

¹ Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, *In Search of Excellence* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), p. 8-19.

² George M. Coggins, *Excellence in the Military* (Doctorate Dissertation, School of Business and Management, United States International University), p. 5.

³ Paul R. Lees-Harvey, *The Questionnaire Design Handbook* (Huntsville, AL: Lees-Harvey Association, Inc, 1980), p. 76.

⁴ Ibid., p. 76-77.

⁵ Ibid., p. 76-78.

⁶ Ibid., p. 71-72.

⁷ This development of subcultures in the 75th Ranger Regiment was developed by Francis Kearney in his U.S. Army War College Research Project, "The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study." His development of sub-cultures was based upon Edgar Schein's article "Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning," *Sloan Management Review* 38, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 13-15.

⁸ Robert V. Krejcie and Daryle W. Morgan, "Small-Sample Techniques," *The NEA Research Bulletin* 38 (December 1960): 993.

⁹ Carl Townsend, *Mastering EXCEL on the IBM PC* (San Francisco: Sybey Press, 1985), p. xxiv - 1.

¹⁰ Julian L. Simon, *Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 269.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data collected from the survey questionnaire and the information gathered during the literature review. The survey questionnaire, which was designed and implemented in accordance with the standards outlined in chapter three, was the primary research instrument for the study. The literature review, which was summarized in chapter two, was the crucible of ideas for the study. Specifically, this study examines how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment effects leadership practices in the unit. The study addresses the subordinate issues of: (1) How does unit culture develop in an organization? (2) What effect does unit culture have on an organization? (3) How does unit culture effect an organization's leadership? and (4) How did the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture develop?

Survey Questionnaire Completion Results

The 75th Ranger Regiment administered the survey questionnaire to a total of 98 leaders currently assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment. The respondents chosen to participate in the survey represented the officers and noncommissioned officers of the 75th Ranger Regiment responsible for the daily execution of leadership tasks in the unit. Respondents fell into two categories: executive leaders (officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the rank of Master Sergeant to Command Sergeant Major, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience), and mid-level leaders (noncommissioned officers in the rank of Sergeant to Sergeant First Class, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience). The survey

was not administered to leaders who are categorized as candidates (Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains who are newly assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and who have no previous Ranger unit experience).¹ As stated in the previous chapter, a representative sample of leaders assigned to the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, at Fort Benning, Georgia, completed the survey questionnaire.

At any given time within the Regimental Headquarters Company and the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, there are approximately 30 leaders who fall into the category of executive leaders. To gain a representative sample of this size population, the study required the completion of the survey questionnaire by 30 officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the rank of Master Sergeant to Command Sergeant Major, who are Ranger course qualified and have previous Ranger unit experience.² As required, 30 executive leaders returned surveys that were complete, legible, and correctly filled out. On one of the surveys in this category, the respondent listed his current unit as 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Due to the earlier noted assumption, that there is no significant distinction between the three battalions, the respondent's completed survey was used. The respondent's answers did not vary from the answers of other respondents in this category.

At any given time within the Regimental Headquarters Company and 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, there are approximately 70 leaders who fall into the category of mid-level leaders. To gain a representative sample of this size population, the study required the completion of the survey questionnaire by 65 noncommissioned officers in the rank of Sergeant to Sergeant First Class, who are Ranger course qualified and have

previous Ranger unit experience.³ Respondents in this category completed a total of 68 surveys. However, three surveys were not used. Two of the surveys were not fully completed and one survey was completed by a promotable Specialist. This left the required number of 65 surveys in this category that were complete, legible, and correctly filled out.

Demographic Information

The questionnaire asked for the following demographic information from each respondent: rank, current unit, amount of time in current unit, current duty position, amount of time in current duty position, and all previous duty positions in the 75th Ranger Regiment to include months assigned to those positions. The primary purpose of this data was to determine which category the respondent was a member of and to insure that no leaders with less than six months service in the 75th Ranger Regiment completed the survey questionnaire. Table 1 illustrates the number of respondents by rank. This distribution is consistent with the rank distribution found in the regiment and allows for the analysis of data in the study's two demographic categories: executive leaders and mid-level leaders. Although the data on duty position and company size unit was collected, for the purposes of this study, it will not be used to analyze responses.

Table 1 - Rank of Respondents					
Executive Leaders				Mid-level Leaders	
LTC	1	SGM	1	SFC	9
MAJ	9	1SG	3	SSG	25
CPT	13	MSG	3	SGT	31

Demographic Analysis of Survey Questionnaire Responses

Responses to all survey questions were analyzed by comparing the responses of the executive leaders against those of the mid-level leaders. Fourteen questions from the survey questionnaire, questions 3, 4, 6-9, 11, 14, 15, 28, 31, 32, 34, and 49, exhibited statistical significance when the chi-square test was applied. None of these questions fell into the categories of Structure, Systems, or Style. The questions did fall into the McKinsey 7-S Model categories of Shared Values, Skills, Staff, and Strategy. Within these categories, this study analyzed responses as follows.

Demographic Analysis of Questions Pertaining to Shared Values

The shared values category of the survey questionnaire had the most questions that showed statistical significance using the chi-square test. Six of the fourteen analyzed questions came from this category. The consistency of respondent answers within each demographic group reflects an agreement on the importance of shared values within the 75th Ranger Regiment. These results are consistent with information gathered during the literature review. Documents such as the Ranger Creed and Abrams' Charter guided the leadership of the first two Ranger battalions when they were forming those units. These shared values now form the core of the unit's culture. As Edgar Schein showed in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, these basic values will affect all aspects of the organization. Specifically, the questions on shared values reveal the following results.

First, responses to question 9 suggest that there is a very strong belief that the values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are published in official and unofficial documents.

Table 2 - Comparison of Question 9							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are established in official and unofficial documents.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	65	100	0	0	0	0	65
Total	95		0		0		95
Chi-square = 22.25 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

All executive and mid-level leaders agreed that the values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are published in official and unofficial documents. The follow up question, question 10 on the survey questionnaire, was an open-ended question which asked, “If you answered yes to question 9, then indicate what unit documents contain the 75th Ranger Regiment’s values.” The respondent had lines to list three sources. All listed at least one source. Some listed up to three sources. The top three responses of what documents contained the 75th Ranger Regiment’s values were the Ranger Creed, Abrams’ Charter, and the Ranger Standards Booklet commonly referred to as the “Blue Book.” All respondents in both demographic groups listed at least one of the top three responses. The most common response among executive leaders was the Ranger Creed. The most common response among mid-level leaders was the “Blue Book.”

These responses indicate that both demographic groups agree that established values exist in the 75th Ranger Regiment. However, for the mid-level leader, these values are viewed to come from the “Blue Book.” These values are objective, and relate

to specific standards of performance and behavior. At the executive level, these values are viewed to come from the Ranger Creed. These values are more subjective than the objective standards found in the "Blue Book," and provide guidance for beliefs and attitudes.

This supports one of the conclusions found in *In Search of Excellence*. Peters and Waterman assert that it is the tangible, objective effects of a culture that have the greatest initial influence on initiating action in a group. The "Blue Book" clearly outlines many of the tangible elements and behaviors that are part of the artifact level of the 75th Ranger Regiment's culture. Standards for high-and-tight haircuts, starched uniforms, and spit-shined boots are outlined in the "Blue Book." These behaviors shaped mid-level leaders on a daily basis as they grew up in the unit. Mid-level leaders emphasized these behaviors daily and clung to these standards as a measure of success. It is not until a Ranger leader expands his experiences and broadens his perspective that he understands the importance of the values, which shape beliefs and attitudes, not just behavior. This maturation process is important since culture, which shapes behavior, will bring compliance to organizational standards; however, culture, which shapes attitudes and beliefs, will bring commitment to the organization.

Responses to question 3 suggest that more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agree that the values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are explicitly linked to the unit's near-term goals and objectives. Again, if the executive leaders view values as providing overarching guidance for beliefs and attitudes, they can more directly relate the values to the resulting behavior that stems from those beliefs and attitudes. However, if the mid-level leaders view values as objective measures outlined in the "Blue Book," then

day-to-day activities that often provide exceptions to standard operating procedures may result in a view that values may not always effect behaviors.

Table 3 – Comparison of Question 3							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are explicitly linked to the unit’s near-term goals and objectives.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	55	84.70	7	10.78	3	4.62	65
Total	85		7		3		95
Chi-square = 20.14 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

These responses to question 3 suggest strong support for the conclusions of Collins and Porras in *Built to Last*. Collins and Porras state that successful organizations possess a culture that is willing to change everything, except their basic beliefs and core values. Executive leaders believe that this condition exists in the 75th Ranger Regiment. Values and beliefs, as written in the Ranger Creed and Abrams’ Charter, are fundamental and provide organizational stability for change and flexibility in other areas. However, mid-level leaders’ values are defined by behaviors outlined in the “Blue Book.” An effort to change these behaviors is an attack on the regiment’s unique culture. The more of an effort that a leader or an outsider makes to change these valued behaviors, the more the mid-level leaders will resist this change and the more extreme their behavior will become to preserve these behaviors. Thus, the same valued behaviors, which help form the tangible aspects of a culture, may contribute to extreme behavior within that culture.

To a slightly lesser degree statistically, responses to question 4 reveal the same findings as those of question 3. Again, more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agree that the values of the 75th Ranger Regiment affect the day-to-day behaviors and activities of its members.

Table 4 – Comparison of Question 4							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment affect the day-to-day behaviors and activities of its members.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	59	90.86	4	6.16	2	3.08	65
Total	89		4		2		95
Chi-square = 33.37							
Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

Since mid-level leaders believe that the values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are objective and are outlined in the “Blue Book,” an effort to change behavior or a lapse in acceptable behavior demonstrates how the organization’s shared values are not effecting behaviors and activities in the unit. A good example of this is the issue of Ranger haircut standards. The “Blue Book” states, “All Rangers will have a fresh haircut before first formation of the first duty day of each week. The hair will be very close on the sides [shaved] and not exceed one inch on top.”⁴ The experience of this researcher suggests that most mid-level leaders believe that the high-and-tight haircut is an important aspect of the unit’s culture. It is a measurable behavior that identifies someone as a member of the unit. However, in today’s environment, the high-and-tight haircut could be a liability.

It can make a Ranger stand out as a possible target among other soldiers. It can make a Ranger stand out as extreme among civilians.


Many executive leaders believe that what is more important than the behavior of getting a high-and-tight haircut every Sunday, is the internalization of the espoused values of physical readiness, neatness of dress, and military bearing that the haircut is supposed to represent. Relaxing the haircut standards, a change in behavior, should not affect internalized beliefs. Relaxing the haircut standards should help the 75th Ranger Regiment present a less extreme image. However, for new members and some mid-level leaders, this behavior is an act that builds and reinforces the internalization of the espoused values of physical readiness, neatness of dress, and military bearing. Discarding the behavior may thus inhibit the internalization of these espoused values. This again supports Schein's understanding that the three different levels of culture (artifact, espoused value, and basic assumption) have varying degrees of importance for different groups within the culture.

Responses to questions 6, 7 and 8 reinforce the findings of questions 3 and 4. Again more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agree that the values of 75th Ranger Regiment influence the unit's strategy, structure, and style. Table 5 reflects these numbers. What is interesting about these responses is the shift in the mode within the two demographic groups for all questions in the shared values category. Table 6 depicts the frequency of response for each of the demographic categories for questions 1- 9.

Table 5 - Comparison of Questions 6, 7, & 8							
Question 6							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit’s strategies.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	54	83.16	7	10.78	4	6.16	65
Total	84		7		4		95
Chi-square = 17.76 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							
Question 7							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit’s organizational structure.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	28	93.24	2	6.66	0	0	30
Mid-level	49	75.46	15	23.10	1	1.54	65
Total	77		17		1		95
Chi-square = 15.02 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							
Question 8							
“The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit’s style.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	58	89.32	7	10.78	0	0	65
Total	88		7		0		95
Chi-square = 28.22 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

As one can see, the mode of responses for the executive leaders falls in the Strongly Agrees column. However, the mode of responses for the mid-level leader shifts to the Agree column. This suggests that the executive leaders believe more strongly that the shared values of the 75th Ranger Regiment have an effect on all aspects of the unit

than the mid-level leaders. This reinforces the findings of Edgar Schein in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. Schein concludes that it is the group leaders who shape a culture's beliefs, attitudes, and values. The more a leader trusts these values, the greater is his reliance on those values to make decisions. Also, as Stephen Covey states in *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, "The ability to subordinate an impulse to a value is the essence of the proactive person. Reactive people are driven by feelings, by circumstances, by conditions, by their environment."⁵ Proactive leaders are driven by values, which are carefully thought out, selected, and internalized. As mid-level leaders mature and gain experience, these values, which influence attitudes and beliefs, become further internalized. This process empowers leaders to control the effects of their circumstances, conditions, and environment.



The responses to the questions in the shared values category suggest that both executive leaders and mid-level leaders agree that shared values are clearly established in the 75th Ranger Regiment. These values are published in official and unofficial

documents. On the one hand, most executive leaders believe that shared values are defined in the Ranger Creed. These values are subjective, and define beliefs and attitudes in the unit. On the other hand, most mid-level leaders believe that shared values are defined in the Ranger Standards Book. These values are more objective and define accepted behavior in the unit.

Both executive leaders and mid-level leaders believe that shared values influence day-to-day activities, near-term goals, strategies, structure, and style in the 75th Ranger Regiment. Executive leaders believe that shared values translate into beliefs and attitudes at the espoused-value level of unit culture. However, mid-level leaders believe that shared values translate into accepted and expected behavior at the artifact level of unit culture. For the mid-level leader, this belief limits the perceived effect that shared values have on the unit. In general, executive leaders believe that shared values have a greater effect on the unit than do the mid-level leaders. However, as mid-level leaders mature and gain experience, they too learn the importance of values, which guide beliefs and attitude. Mid-level leaders learn how those values empower proactive leaders to make decisions that are consistent with the objectives of the organization.

Demographic Analysis of Questions Pertaining to Staff

The staff category of questions analyzed prevalent views on the procedures through which the members of the 75th Ranger Regiment are selected, trained, and evaluated. In this category, three questions showed statistical significance using the chi-square test.

First, responses to question 11 suggest that generally, the same percentage of executive leaders and mid-level leaders agree and the same percentage of both categories

of leaders disagree that the 75th Ranger Regiment maintains personnel stability in key positions.

Table 7 – Comparison of Question 11							
“The 75th Ranger Regiment maintains personnel stability in key positions.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	26	86.58	0	0	4	13.32	30
Mid-level	52	80.08	5	7.70	8	12.32	65
Total	78		5		12		95
Chi-square = 14.03 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

Understanding the U.S. Army policy on reassignment and upward advancement, both executive leaders and mid-level leaders believe that the 75th Ranger Regiment manages the assignment of key personnel as well as possible. Two comments provided by respondents indicate that the small measure of dissatisfaction comes from the assignment instability of junior level leaders. One respondent, a squad leader in the mid-level leader group, disagreed and wrote, “Too much turbulence at the team leader and squad leader level.” Another respondent, a staff NCO in the mid-level leader group, disagreed and wrote, “12% monthly turn-over in section positions; varies with differing command climate.” These comments suggest support for the belief that the 75th Ranger Regiment stabilizes key leader positions within the constraints of the U.S. Army’s reassignment and upward movement policies.

For this researcher, these comments are surprising in that many mid-level leaders have voiced a concern that officers usually only come to the 75th Ranger Regiment to

“punch their ticket” and enhance their own careers. Mid-level leaders, who provide long-term, organizational stability, feel this frustration. A squad leader will often serve in his position for four years and work for up to four platoon leaders and two company commanders. However, the responses to this question provide no indication of this frustration. It is assumed that although the shorter tour policy for officers is a source of frustration, mid-level leaders understand that Army policy is forcing it to occur. By understanding this, perhaps they feel that they are able to compensate for this shortcoming. They apparently trust that the platoon leaders and company commanders are there for the right reasons.

This level of trust and ability to compensate for weaknesses across an organization is characteristic of what Peter Senge describes as “great teams.” In *The Fifth Discipline*, Senge writes, “a great team was a group of people who functioned together in an extraordinary way--trusted one another, who complemented each others’ strengths and compensated for each others’ limitations, who had common goals that were larger than individual goals.”⁶ Although this characteristic does not guarantee extraordinary results, it does establish important preconditions for fostering a learning organization. The fact that mid-level leaders did not voice this frustration indicates that the current leader management process in the 75th Ranger Regiment supports a key characteristic of a learning organization.

Next, responses to question 14 indicate that generally the same percentage of executive leaders and mid-level leaders agree that the 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented developmental programs to provide individual performance appraisal at all levels of the organization.

Table 8 - Comparison of Question 14							
“The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented developmental programs to provide individual performance appraisal at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	26	86.58	3	9.99	1	3.33	30
Mid-level	60	92.40	5	7.70	0	0	65
Total	86		8		1		95
Chi-square = 14.37 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance $P < .05$							

This researcher's experience in the 75th Ranger Regiment supports the belief that performance feedback is an important part of the unit. Junior soldiers are regularly counseled in writing on their performance. Leaders at all levels feel that their performance is measured daily. The slightly higher level of agreement with question 14 by the mid-level leaders indicates that written counseling is usually more formalized at the junior level than at other levels in the organization.

What these responses cannot reveal is the content of the performance feedback. Again, this researchers' experience is that feedback on the junior level is very objective. Feedback provided by executive leaders, though less frequent, is more subjective and focused on character ethics of integrity, professionalism, courage, and leadership. This type of feedback has an empowering effect on the individual. Objective measures of performance can often make people reactive, risk adverse, and uncreative. As Kotter and Heskett noted in *Corporate Culture and Performance*, these are characteristics of non-adaptive cultures; a widespread emphasis on control dampens motivation and initiative.⁷

Performance feedback at all levels of the organization should be focused on character and empowering the individual to improve.

The responses to question 15 provided one of the largest statistical deviations between the two demographic groups. Significantly more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agreed that the 75th Ranger Regiment's program for entry into the unit ensures that the best available personnel are selected into the unit.

Table 9 – Comparison of Question 15							
“The 75th Ranger Regiment’s program for entry into the unit ensures that the best available personnel are selected into the unit.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	29	96.57	0	0	1	3.33	30
Mid-level	42	64.68	2	3.08	21	32.34	65
Total	71		2		22		95
Chi-square = 15.81							
Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

This question also generated the most written comments provided by respondents. All of the written comments came from respondents in the mid-level leader group who did not agree that the regiment's program for entry into the unit ensures that the best available personnel are selected. Several respondents simply noted comments such as, “usually works, but is not consistent,” or “not reliable.” One squad leader wrote, “Too much emphasis on physical ability, not enough on job performance.” Another squad leader noted, “No emphasis on SOF skills.” Finally, a squad leader wrote, “More often than not, anyone that does not quit is accepted.”

The large number of written comments indicates that this area is a major point of frustration for the mid-level leaders, while the executive leaders clearly do not perceive a problem. This difference is probably a result of the fact that executive leaders are not directly involved in the process of assessing new soldiers. A First Sergeant serves as the Commandant for RIP. The Regimental Command Sergeant Major supervises the RIP Commandant. The Regimental Commander interacts with each class. However, all other leaders involved in the process are mid-level leaders. As Covey notes in *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, if there is no involvement, there is no commitment. If there is no commitment, often, reward systems are out of alignment with stated value systems.⁸

In a reversal of previous findings, when it comes to the assessing of new Rangers, executive leaders are more focused on objective measures. Executive leaders seem to focus on the number of replacements coming out of RIP and their ability to meet physical standards. Mid-level leaders are more focused on the balance of knowledge, skill, and desire that new Rangers demonstrate. Mid-level leaders believe that they can work on any one of these areas to improve the balance of the three in a new Ranger. As Covey concludes, "as the area of intersection between knowledge, skill, and desire becomes larger, we more deeply internalize the principles upon which the habits are based and create the strength of character to move toward increasing effectiveness."⁹

Executive leaders should measure their involvement in the accession process. Taken in context with the other responses to questions in this category, more executive leaders than mid-level leaders appear to believe that the regiment is doing a good job at the development of junior soldiers and junior leaders. These differing beliefs could be a

matter of perspective. Executive leaders probably view the overall success of units in the regiment as a measure of how well the regiment is doing in its accession of new soldiers and its development of junior leaders. On the other hand, mid-level leaders must work with the products of the regiment's assessment and junior development programs on a daily basis. Rather than focusing on the overall successes of their units, mid-level leaders judge their success by the performance of their individual soldiers.

Even if the statistical results are only a matter of perspective, for the executive leaders and the mid-level leaders that perspective is reality. This divergence indicates that executive leaders may want to increase involvement in the accession of new soldiers to ensure internalization of the principles that will build knowledge, skill, and desire in the unit.

Demographic Analysis of Questions Pertaining to Skills

The skill category of questions analyzed prevalent views on the strengths, capabilities, and attributes of members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. In this category, three questions showed statistical significance using the chi-square test. First, responses to questions 28 and 32 suggests that all executive leaders and mid-level leaders agree that units in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique capabilities and skills that are not commonly found in other units. Furthermore, the belief that creative skills are used to solve problems indicates the presence of another key characteristic of an adaptive or learning organization. As Senge concludes in *The Fifth Discipline*, "an organization's capacity and commitment to learning can be no greater than that of its members."¹⁰ Both levels of leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment perceive that this commitment to developing and using creative skills exists.

Table 10 – Comparison of Questions 28 & 32							
Question 28							
“Units in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique capabilities that are not commonly found in other units.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	65	100	0	0	0	0	65
Total	95		0		0		95
Chi-square = 22.25 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							
Question 32							
“Within the 75th Ranger Regiment, individuals use their creative skills for solving most operational problems.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	63	97.02	2	3.08	0	0	65
Total	93		2		0		95
Chi-square = 14.98 Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

However, the responses to question 31 indicate another possible conflict of perspective between the executive leaders and the mid-level leaders. The responses to question 31 indicate that more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agree that the 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the skills of Rangers at all levels of the organization. These results are significant since mid-level leaders feel that tangible aspects of the unit, such as individual skills are an important part of the unit culture.

Table 11 – Comparison of Question 31							
“The 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the skills of Rangers at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	28	93.24	1	3.33	1	3.33	30
Mid-level	49	75.46	14	21.56	2	3.08	65
Total	77		15		3		95
Chi-square = 13.23							
Degrees of Freedom = 2							
Significance P < .05							

This differing perspective in the effectiveness of training and evaluation programs may stem from the fact that executive leaders and mid-level leaders have differing views on what skills are important for Rangers at all levels of the organization. For instance, executive leaders generally focus on skills such as leadership and problem solving. Mid-level leaders generally focus on skills such as marksmanship and fieldcraft. The ability of mid-level leaders to improve these objective skills is limited by resources, such as ammunition and training time on the range or in the field. The effort to improve “softer” skills such as leadership and problem solving can occur under any conditions, during any event. In fact, executive leaders have initiated programs to do this. The most obvious example is physical training, which is conducted at squad level so that all Rangers can gain the experience by leading their peers. Similarly, junior leaders will serve as jumpmasters and fastropemasters on all critical missions. This type of process demonstrates an investment in the future leaders of the unit.

In *The Fifth Discipline*, Senge describes this process as personal mastery.

Personal mastery is a critical element of an adaptive or learning organization. Learning in the context of personal mastery is not merely acquiring more information. It is the process of expanding the ability to produce the results that improve effectiveness.¹¹ For an organization, personal mastery allows leaders to take actions that will payoff in the future rather than in the context of some current crisis.

Demographic Analysis of Questions Pertaining to Strategy

The strategy category of questions analyzed prevalent views on the plans to sustain or improve resource utilization in the 75th Ranger Regiment. In this category, two questions showed statistical significance using the chi-square test.

First, responses to question 34 suggest that most executive leaders and mid-level leaders agree that the 75th Ranger Regiment's policies and instructions are clearly stated. This supports the data found in the shared values category of questions. Leaders stated that policies and instructions are found in the Ranger Standards Booklet.

Table 12 – Comparison of Question 34							
“The 75th Ranger Regiment’s policies and instructions are clearly stated.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	29	96.57	0	0	1	3.33	30
Mid-level	63	97.02	2	3.08	0	0	65
Total	92		2		1		95
Chi-square = 12.11			Degrees of Freedom = 2				
Significance P < .05							

This suggests a general acceptance and understanding of the regiment's plans and policies by leaders at both levels. These results support the findings from the shared values category of questions. Just as official documents express the values of the unit, documents such as policy letters and command philosophies express the unit's policies and instructions.

However, one respondent, a mid-level leader noted, "Many times policies are open to case-by-case judgment." Another mid-level leader wrote, "Standards are changed in some cases, to allow personnel a second chance." This comment suggests support for the earlier finding that mid-level leaders feel that values in the unit are objective – that they are black-or-white. These beliefs, and the responses to question 49, highlight these differing perspectives between executive leaders and mid-level leaders on where values and decisions are made in the unit.

Table 13 - Comparison of Question 49							
“In the 75th Ranger Regiment, long range planning is used to adjust strategies.”							
	<u>Agree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
Executive	30	100	0	0	0	0	30
Mid-level	41	63.14	24	36.96	0	0	65
Total	71		24		0		95
Chi-square = 19.96			Degrees of Freedom = 2				
Significance P < .05							

The responses to question 49 provided the largest statistical deviations between the two demographic groups. Significantly more executive leaders than mid-level leaders agreed that in the 75th Ranger Regiment, long range planning is used to adjust strategies.

Several mid-level leaders who responded with "No Opinion" provided comments on this question. One squad leader wrote, "[It] changes too much on a week to week basis." Another squad leader noted next to his response that, "All change is bad." Another staff NCO noted, "Last-minute taskings affect long-range planning."

These responses suggest a frustration of the mid-level leaders not being able to control the people, the systems, and the environment. At the artifact level of its culture, the 75th Ranger Regiment reinforces the ability to be in absolute control. One is successful if he is decisive, has the answers, and forcefully advocates his views. At the artifact level, no thinking is involved; one is told how to act, dress, and speak. As noted earlier, however, as a leader matures, he learns how values, which shape beliefs and attitude, not just behavior, empower the organization and its members. When a leader no longer clings to the artifact level of his culture, and instead clings to the values and beliefs of his culture, that leader's perspective changes. Those values and beliefs force a sense of self-evaluation and organizational evaluation. At that point, the leader is then capable of making a commitment to the effectiveness of the organization.

Thus, in the category of strategy, both levels of leaders believe that the plans and policies of the 75th Ranger Regiment are clear. However, executive leaders believe that values and beliefs are driving the unit's strategy, while a significant percentage of the mid-level leaders believe that near-term requirements that cannot be controlled often overcome the unit's long range strategy.

Insufficiencies of the Research Instrument

Although detailed measures were taken to ensure the validity, reliability, and relevance of the research instrument, the study does acknowledge some shortcomings.

First, the survey failed to gain any statistically significant data in the categories of systems, style, and structure. This gap resulted in the analysis of only four of the seven categories of the McKinsey 7-S Model. It can be assumed that just because the data in those categories was statistically significant, that factors in the remaining categories of unit culture still have an effect on leadership practices in the unit.

Also, the survey questionnaire contained too many questions. With two small population sizes, the data became difficult to manage and often suggested conflicting conclusions. The number of questions in each category of the McKinsey 7-S Model should be reduced.

Finally, the survey only provided a snapshot of prevalent views on the impact of unit culture on leadership practices. It would have been more effective to administer the survey questionnaire at the beginning of the research study and then again at the end. This method would have allowed some measure of the changes that are occurring in the perpetual cause and effect relationship between the unit and its culture. Gathering data over a greater period of time could allow for a better understanding of the climate in the unit.

Alternatively, an informal interview could have been conducted in conjunction with the survey questionnaire to gain some measure of the changes that are occurring. Direct contact with the respondents could have allowed respondents to elaborate on their ideas and thoughts. This information would have been very useful in the analysis process.

Summary

This chapter analyzed the data collected from the survey questionnaire and the information gathered during the literature review. Specifically, the chapter explained the demographic information and how it was used to group the completed survey questionnaires. Responses that achieved statistical significance were then analyzed in each of the categories of shared values, staff, skills, and strategy. The responses indicated that cultural factors in those four categories effect leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

In the shared values category, both executive leaders and mid-level leaders appear to agree that shared values are clearly established in the 75th Ranger Regiment. Most executive leaders appear to believe that shared values are defined in the Ranger Creed. These values are subjective, and define beliefs and attitudes in the unit. On the other hand, most mid-level leaders appear to believe that shared values are defined in the Ranger Standards Book. These values are more objective, and define accepted behavior in the unit.

Both executive leaders and mid-level leaders appear to believe that shared values influence day-to-day activities, near-term goals, strategies, structure, and style in the 75th Ranger Regiment. Executive leaders appear to believe that shared values translate into beliefs and attitudes at the espoused value level of unit culture. However, mid-level leaders appear to believe that shared values translate into accepted and expected behavior at the artifact level of unit culture. For the mid-level leader, this belief limits the perceived effect that shared values have on the unit. Also, for some mid-level leaders and new members, these behaviors build and reinforce the internalization of espoused values.

Thus, the three different levels of culture (artifact, espoused value, and basic assumption) have varying degrees of importance for different groups within the culture.

In general, executive leaders appear to believe more strongly that shared values have a greater effect on the unit than do the mid-level leaders. Values that shape behavior bring compliance, but values that shape attitudes and beliefs bring commitment. However, as mid-level leaders mature and gain experience, they too learn the importance of values, which guide beliefs and attitude. Mid-level leaders learn how those values empower proactive leaders to adjust to changing circumstances, conditions, and environments.

In the staff category, more executive leaders than mid-level leaders appear to believe that the regiment is doing a good job at the development of junior soldiers and junior leaders. These differing beliefs could be a matter of perspective. Executive leaders probably view the overall success of units in the regiment as a measure of how well the regiment is doing in its accession of new soldiers and its development of junior leaders. On the other hand, rather than focusing on the overall successes of their units, mid-level leaders perceive their success by measuring the performance of their individual soldiers. This perception may indicate that executive leaders want to increase their involvement in the accession of new soldiers to ensure the internalization of the principles that will build knowledge, skill, and desire in the unit.

This involvement is critical at the beginning of the indoctrination process. As Schein documents, tangible aspects and behavior have the greatest effect on the initiation process. Monitoring these behaviors ensures that reward systems are in alignment with stated value systems. This synchronization is critical since these same valued behaviors,

which help form the tangible aspects of culture, may contribute to extreme behavior within the culture.

In the skills category, both mid-level leaders and executive leaders appear to agree that members of the 75th Ranger Regiment have unique skills and that they are using those skills to solve operational problems. However, executive leaders and mid-level leaders do have differing views on what skills are important for Rangers at different levels of the organization. Whichever skills are important, the regiment should have a process that develops these skills and demonstrates an investment in the future leaders of the unit. This process will foster personal mastery. Personal mastery is a critical element of an adaptive or learning organization. For an organization, personal mastery is the process of expanding the ability to produce the results that improve effectiveness.

In the strategy category, both levels of leaders appear to believe that the plans and policies of the 75th Ranger Regiment are clear. However, executive leaders appear to believe that long range planning is driving the unit's strategy, while a significant percentage of the mid-level leaders appear to believe that near-term requirements often overcome long range planning. This frustration stems from the mid-level leader's belief that he cannot control all aspects of the system and the environment. At the artifact level of its culture, the 75th Ranger Regiment reinforces the ability of a leader to be in absolute control. The artifact level of its culture does not reinforce creative thinking and flexibility. However, as a leader matures, he learns how values, which shape beliefs and attitude, not just behavior, empower the organization's strategy and its members. When a leader no longer clings to the artifact level of his culture and instead clings to the values and beliefs of his culture, that leader's perspective changes. Those values and beliefs

force a sense of self-evaluation and organizational evaluation. At that point, the leader is then capable of making a commitment to the effectiveness of the organization.

This analysis, in these four categories, serves as the basis for the conclusions and recommendations in the next chapter.

¹ This development of subcultures in the 75th Ranger Regiment was developed by Francis Kearney in his U.S. Army War College Research Project, "The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study." His development of sub-cultures was based upon Edgar Schein's article "Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning," *Sloan Management Review* 38, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 13-15.

² Robert V. Krejcie and Daryle W. Morgan, "Small-Sample Techniques," *The NEA Research Bulletin* 38 (December 1960): 993.

³ Ibid., p.933.

⁴ Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, *Ranger Standards* (Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Government Printing, 18 April 1995), p.2. Though the "Blue Book" does not specifically say that the head must be shaven, all Rangers understand that the expected standard is that the sides and back of the head will be shaven.

⁵ Stephen Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 72.

⁶ Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Currency-Doubleday, 1990), p.4.

⁷ John Kotter and James Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 141-150.

⁸ Covey, p. 142-143.

⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁰ Senge, p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid., p.141-142.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examined how unit culture affects leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment. The study addressed the subordinate issues of: (1) How does unit culture develop in an organization? (2) What effect does unit culture have on an organization? (3) How does unit culture effect an organization's leadership? and (4) How did the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture develop? Data analysis suggested that certain aspects of unit culture, specifically its shared values, staff procedures, skills and strategy, have an affect on the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Conclusions

Based on the analysis in chapter four, this study suggests that the cultural factors of shared values, staff procedures, skills, and strategy have the following affects on leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment:

1. Executive leaders are more likely than mid-level leaders to delegate actions and responsibility for actions down to lower levels of the unit.
2. Mid-level leaders are more likely than executive leaders to identify and eliminate soldiers who cannot meet established standards.
3. Mid-level leaders are more likely than executive leaders to risk new methods to achieve mission accomplishment.

First, executive leaders are more likely to delegate actions and responsibility for actions down to lower levels of the unit than are mid-level leaders because the artifact level of unit culture influences the actions of mid-level leaders. As the statistical data

suggests, mid-level leaders believe that the shared values of the regiment are defined in the Ranger Standards Book. These values define expected levels of behavior. There is no need to delegate any action because mid-level leaders generally believe that all behavior is defined by these values.

On the other hand, the espoused-value level of unit culture inspires the actions of executive leaders. Edgar Schein predicts this phenomenon in his three level model of organizational culture.¹ Executive leaders appear to believe that the shared values of the regiment are defined in the Ranger Creed. These values define the principles and attitudes of members of the unit. This belief allows executive leaders to readily delegate actions to subordinate leaders. Executive leaders can then focus on broader issues that may have greater long-term effect on the unit. Thus, by relinquishing control of certain actions, executive leaders gain greater control of the long-term success of the unit.

Executive leaders appear to have apparently reached a level of maturation where they are no longer shaped by the artifact level of unit culture. Instead, they appear to anchor their core ideology in the values and beliefs of the regiment's culture. As noted by Schein in his explanation of the development of cultures, this maturation process is important.² It is important because, culture, which shapes behavior, will bring only compliance; however, culture, which shapes values and beliefs, will bring commitment. This commitment fosters a willingness and desire to empower all members of the regiment in order to improve the unit's effectiveness.

The act of delegating fits many of the models of learning or adaptive organizations. Delegation increases initiative and motivation in an organization. However, the regiment's leadership should be aware of the tendency of executive leaders

to delegate. The regiment may need to take steps that will ensure that this action can continue in the future. This process of delegation could be hazardous to the organization if authority is pushed down to leaders who are not committed to the values and beliefs of the regiment. It therefore becomes essential that the regiment adequately train and prepare leaders for increased levels of responsibility.

Secondly, mid-level leaders are more likely than executive leaders to identify and eliminate soldiers who cannot meet established standards, because the artifact level of unit culture controls their means of evaluating subordinates. As statistical data from the survey suggests, mid-level leaders believe that the shared values of the regiment are defined in the Ranger Standards Booklet. Mid-level leaders appear to believe that the regiment's shared values translate into expected behavior. This belief produces a very objective measure of expectations which may suggest why mid-level leaders appear to believe that the regiment does not do a good job selecting, training, and developing new rangers.

Mid-level leaders generally are shaped by the artifact level of the regiment's culture. Its tangible elements give junior members clear guidelines for success and acceptance. At the artifact level of the unit's culture, little thinking is involved. At the artifact level of its culture, the 75th Ranger Regiment reinforces the ability of the leader to be in absolute control. But as Schein explains in his model of organizational culture, adherence to the tangible elements of an organization's culture serves as a vehicle that reinforces internalization of the organization's values and beliefs. As the data suggests, this is true in the regiment. Elements of the artifact level of the unit culture, such as high-and-tight haircuts, the black beret, and Ranger scroll, help to inculcate the values of

self-discipline, professionalism, and attention to detail. It is as if the espoused-value level of unit culture can not be attained without the foundation of the artifact level. This implies that it is important to allow leaders to mold behaviors early and often at the artifact level of the regiment's culture.

Finally, mid-level leaders are more likely than executive leaders to risk new methods or techniques to achieve mission accomplishment. Mid-level leaders appear to believe that members of the regiment have unique skills, and that they successfully use those skills to solve problems. Additionally, mid-level leaders appear to believe that near-term requirements often outweigh long-range planning and strategy. This confidence in skills to overcome problems and emphasis on near-term goals could result in actions that jeopardize long-term strategies. As Schein states, the leader is the most important element in how a culture develops in an organization.³ If an entire category of an organization's leadership believes that success comes from applying skills to solve current crises, then the organization could suffer failure over the long-term as it loses sight of its overall objectives. Additionally, as Schein concludes, an over confidence in skills could lead to institutional arrogance and a reluctance to change.

To achieve increased effectiveness, the regiment should allow leaders to take actions that will pay-off in the future, rather than in the context of some current crisis. Proactive leaders are driven by values, which are carefully thought out, selected, and internalized. This process of formulating values develops over time. As mid-level leaders gain experience, these values become further internalized. This results in greater commitment to the organization.

Answers to Research Questions

How Does Unit Culture Develop in an Organization?

Statistically significant data from the survey suggests that many aspects of an organization effect how unit culture develops. The data highlights the importance of shared values in the process of developing a unit culture. This supports Schein's conclusion that a culture is established when a group forms to achieve a specific goal. The group is formed because someone perceived that the coordinated effort of the group could accomplish more than individual action. The culture grows as shared basic assumptions are learned as the group solves problems in an effort to reach its goal.

Leaders are vital in shaping the group's culture, since it is the leaders who propose the answers to problems that the group may face. This is evident in the effect that the initial leaders of the first two Ranger battalions had on the development of the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture. Once the leader activates the group, strong group members can propose other solutions, and the cultural learning process expands. Statistical data suggests that the cultural learning process varies depending upon which level of the organization is involved. Mid-level leaders appear to adhere to the artifact level of the unit culture. Executive leaders appear to progress to the espoused-value level of the unit culture. At some point, the behavior and strategy of the organizational leader does not constitute a culture unless most group members actively follow the leader's practices.

In essence, it is the organization and its actions, rituals, and structures that have the greatest sustaining effect in shaping the organization's own culture of behaviors, beliefs, values, and assumptions. The importance of actions, such as the reciting of the

Ranger Creed and undergoing a formalized indoctrination program, help explain the strength of the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment. This is not to say that the organization's culture reaches a state of being static. Crises force an organization to reevaluate its values or practices. But it is the organization's behaviors, beliefs, and values that will shape that reevaluation.

Thus, to understand how an organization develops a unit culture, one must understand and accept the existence of culture in groups that possess a stated purpose. Unit culture is developed through the constant internal and external interaction of the group with itself and its environment.

What Effect Does Unit Culture Have on an Organization?

The data suggests that the action of developing the culture has a reciprocal effect on the organization. A perpetual cause-and-effect exchange results between the organization and its culture. Specifically, the cultural elements of shared values, staff procedures, skills, and strategy have a statistically significant effect on the 75th Ranger Regiment.

One can detect this effect by observing elements of the artifact level of the regiment's culture at any ranger unit area. Every entrance way is adorned with a large Ranger Scroll, every orderly room has posted a framed copy of the Ranger Creed, and every ranger has a high-and-tight haircut. As Schein concluded, culture effects every physical aspect of an organization from the design of offices, to the manner of dress and language used. It affects intangible aspects of an organization such as ceremonies, implicit standards of behavior, and ideological principles that guide group action. Most

importantly, culture affects an organization's climate, habit of thinking, and shared values.

Culture may also negatively affect an organization. First, a culture can blind an organization to facts that do not match its basic assumptions. The process of how an organization solves problems influences the organization's culture. The organization develops patterns or models to solve problems. These patterns or models act as filters that screen data coming into the organization. Data that agrees with the organization's patterns or models has an easy pathway to recognition. However, data that does not agree with the organization's past successful patterns or models is difficult for the organization to handle. In fact, the organization may simply ignore the data.⁴ How might this effect the 75th Ranger Regiment when it may have to integrate females into the unit some time in the future? From the perspective of many members, the regiment has been successful without females. Does this suggest that it will be unsuccessful with females? The data suggests that any initial failures by females would only reinforce the apparent perspective that females could not improve the success of the regiment.

Second, an entrenched culture can make implementing a new strategy very difficult. Sometimes, no matter how much data an organization may have that contradicts its current patterns and models, the organization will not abandon those patterns and models if they have been successful in the past. It is especially difficult for some leaders to abandon those patterns and models since they are what brought success to those leaders. If the Army directed all specialty units to relinquish the beret and wear only the standard field cap, how would the 75th Ranger Regiment react? Would an inability to

adapt on this issue effect other aspects of the unit? The data suggests that the ability to change would be different at each level of the regiment.

Remembering that the culture and the organization are in a perpetual, reciprocal exchange, it is easy to understand how culture can cause these results. It is as if the very successes of the organization, the shared experiences and values, could result in an organization that looks only inward and stifles initiative.

To summarize, culture affects every aspect of an organization. A perpetual cause-and-effect exchange results between the organization and its culture. Culture provides equilibrium and stability to an organization and facilitates the making of decisions. However, that same level of cultural comfort can have a negative affect on an organization as it may stifle change and blind organizations to facts that do not match its basic assumptions. Only a culture that allows an organization to anticipate and adapt to change will result in success for the organization.

How Does Unit Culture Affect an Organization's Leadership?

The data suggests that leaders are the most important element in how a culture develops in an organization. Mid-level leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment appear to be products of the artifact level of the unit's culture. Their leadership style is formed by the adherence to expected behavior detailed in the Ranger Standards Book. Executive leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment appear to be influenced by the espoused-value level of the unit's culture. Their beliefs and principles stimulate their leadership actions.

The actions of leaders at both levels have brought success to the 75th Ranger Regiment. The basic assumptions or values of the regiment's culture are the product of these past successes. As a result, these basic assumptions or values may increasingly be

taken for granted and operate as filters for what is perceived and thought about in an organization. The danger is that external changes may not be noticed or even if noticed, that the organization may not be able to adapt due to routines based on past successes. The leader must know himself, have insight into his organizational culture, and be able to perceive his environment to keep the organization effective. As Schein concludes in *Organization Culture and Leadership*, the dynamic processes of culture and organizational effectiveness “are the essence of leadership and makes one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin.”⁵

How Did the 75th Ranger Regiment’s Culture Develop?

The data suggests that the 75th Ranger Regiment can trace its culture back to special units that existed throughout the nation’s history. Many tangible elements of the artifact level of the regiment’s culture are traceable to the formation of the first two Ranger battalions from 1973 to 1974. Since the inception of the first two Ranger battalions, units from the 75th Ranger Regiment have successfully completed combat operations in Grenada, Panama, Southwest Asia, Haiti, and Somalia. These successes, built upon the legends of past ranger units, have fostered the regiment’s espoused values and basic assumptions. The regiment’s espoused values are clearly articulated in documents such as the Ranger Creed, Abrams’ Charter, and the Ranger Standards Booklet.

The regiment’s high level of success, its high standards, and its designation as a special operations force unit has somewhat isolated the regiment from the rest of the conventional army. It is within this environment that the culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment has formed three basic assumptions: that all Rangers must perform to standard

or be expelled; that self-discipline and mental toughness are absolutes for all Rangers; and that a highly stressful environment produces positive results.

The data also suggests that the 75th Ranger Regiment demonstrates many positive characteristics found in adaptive or learning cultures. First, leaders appear to be willing to decentralize control in order to increase motivation and initiative in the organization. As found in Peter Senge's model in *The Fifth Discipline*, leaders appear to trust one another; they complement each other's strengths and compensate for each other's limitations; they possess a common goal that is larger than any individual goal. Second, leaders appear to feel a sense of personal mastery that drives them to uphold shared values. Leaders appear to be committed to developing and using creative skills. Personal mastery is a critical element of an adaptive organization. For an organization, personal mastery is the process of expanding the ability to produce the results that improve effectiveness.⁶ Finally, leaders appear to not be risk-averse and believe in being proactive problem solvers. Proactive leaders do not require absolute control. Proactive leaders are driven by values, which are carefully thought out, selected, and internalized. As leaders grow and mature, these values, which influence attitudes and beliefs, become further internalized.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis of the data collected and the derived conclusions, the following recommendations are made. First, the 75th Ranger Regiment should execute an aggressive junior-leader, training program. This program should foster the current practice of empowering junior leaders. The training program should emphasize educating junior leaders to unique aspects of the regiment's strategy, structure, and staff process.

The junior-leader training should also emphasize the importance of shared values that exist at the espoused-value level of the unit's culture. The end result of this training program will be junior leaders who are committed to the values and beliefs of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Second, the 75th Ranger Regiment should allow sufficient time for junior leaders to conduct subordinate-level training. This training should emphasize the importance of training new soldiers to expected levels of performance. Given sufficient time and resources, junior leaders would be less likely to eliminate new soldiers who do not immediately perform to an expected level. This subordinate-level training is critical to the maturation process of mid-level leaders. As mid-level leaders gain experience and mature, they learn the importance of values, which guide beliefs and attitudes. As leaders internalize these values and beliefs, their perspectives change and they are capable of making a commitment to the effectiveness of the organization.

Finally, all levels of leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment should be involved in the long-term policy development process. This participation will ensure that all leaders understand the importance of long range plans and strategies. Leaders will become aware of assumptions and mental models that are part of the unit's culture. Mid-level leaders will feel less frustrated with the inability to gain absolute control. This process will generate greater thinking and dialogue among all groups in the organization and provide greater flexibility to change.

Implications for Further Study

This research study highlights the importance of the effect of unit culture on leadership practices within the 75th Ranger Regiment. The data suggests that further study is needed within the 75th Ranger Regiment, other infantry units, and the Army.

First, to gain more detailed information about the 75th Ranger Regiment, the survey questionnaire could be administered to leaders in all three battalions. This could identify any anomalies in leadership traits that may be effected by aspects of unit culture that are unique to units in each of the three geographic locations. Or, the study could be re-administered to the leaders one year after they first completed the survey. This would reveal how the leaders' perspectives changed over time.

The survey could also be administered to leaders who fall into the candidate category. This information could be used to better understand how unit culture affects leadership practices among all categories of leaders in the unit. This data could also show how values and beliefs are internalized as leaders spend more time in units and mature.

Data from this study could also be used to supplement information that is gathered during the psychological evaluation that all leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment must undergo prior to serving in the regiment. Together, this information could lead to a better understanding of how unit culture effects leadership practices. The result of this further study would be the improved ability to select new leaders for the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Conclusions from this study also highlight areas of organizational culture that should be studied in other infantry units. First, more study is needed to understand how the three levels of culture (artifact, espoused value, and basic assumption) affect different groups within an organization. Newer members tend to cling to the artifact level of a

culture. Will adherence to the artifact level of culture bring effective results when new infantrymen are faced with combat? Infantry operations, such as Task Force Rangers' mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993, succeed when infantrymen seize the initiative. An understanding of the commander's intent for the mission should fuel this initiative. Can this understanding be gained at the artifact level of training? Is this beneficial since the artifact level may help internalization of espoused values? Or, is it detrimental since tangible behaviors at the artifact level of a culture may contribute to extreme behavior in an organization?

For the U.S. Army, more study is needed to understand how leaders mature to a point at which they have internalized values that affect beliefs and attitudes, not just behavior. Are there any specific actions that can accelerate this learning process? As the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army implements the Army's Seven Core Values, it would be useful to better understand what actions facilitate this maturation process. What is the minimum amount of time for this process to occur? What other factors affect how committed members become to an organization's values and beliefs? If the Army's leadership does not fully understand the process, the Chief of Staff's Seven Core Values may end up nothing more than another Army slogan lost over time.

Finally, further study would be useful for students of U.S. Army leadership doctrine who want to conduct a comparative study on other units' cultures. Researchers can further analyze the objective information gathered from the research instrument that was administered to members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Researchers can then gather similar data from other units and make comparisons. As data from the study suggests, no

two units will react to external factors in the same manner. Will the culture of some units negatively effect their ability to adhere to the Army's Seven Core Values?

Further study of this subject could be a self-examination process to improve the Army. Leaders throughout the Army should try to understand the culture within which they operate and how that culture effects their actions and decisions. Every level of leader in the Army can implement this self-examination process daily. By doing so Army leaders will be living up to the words of Sam Damon, the heroic figure in *Once An Eagle*. Damon vowed, "Promise me you won't let your mind atrophy. Self righteousness, it's the occupational disease of the soldier, and it's the worst sin in all the world. Yes! Because it spawns arrogance, selfishness, indifference...Read, think, disagree with everything, if you like—but forge your mind outward. Promise me that!"⁷

¹ Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), p. 27-56.

² Ibid., p. 145-178.

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ Joel Barker, *The Business of Paradigms*, Video Cassette (San Francisco: Vale Studios, 1987).

⁵ Schein, p. 1.

⁶ Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, (New York: Currency Doubleday Press, 1990), p. 1-5.

⁷ Anton Myrer, *Once An Eagle* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winson Publishing, 1968), p. 68.

APPENDIX A

THE RANGER CREED

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor and high esprit de corps of my Ranger Regiment.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land sea or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger, my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be. One hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well-trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country, I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor. Rangers Lead the Way!!

APPENDIX B

ABRAMS' CHARTER

The Ranger Battalion is to be an elite, light, and the most proficient infantry battalion in the world; a battalion that can do things with its hands and weapons better than anyone.

The Battalion will contain no 'hoodlums' or 'brigands' and that if the battalion were formed of such, it would be disbanded. Wherever the Ranger Battalion goes, it is apparent that it is the best.

General Creighton Abrams
Guidance to Commander, 1st Ranger Battalion
Fall 1973

APPENDIX C

WICKHAM'S CHARTER

The Ranger Regiment will draw its members from the entire Army - after service in the Regiment - return these men to the line units of the Army with the Ranger philosophy and standards.

Rangers will lead the way in developing tactics, training techniques, and doctrine for the Army's Light Infantry formations.

The Ranger Regiment will be deeply involved in the development of Ranger Doctrine.

The Regiment will experiment with new equipment to include off-the-shelf items and share the results with the Light Infantry Community.

General John Wickham
Chief of Staff of the Army
Guidance to Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment
10 May 1984

APPENDIX D

SULLIVAN'S CHARTER

The 75th Ranger Regiment sets the standard for light infantry throughout the world. The hallmark of the Regiment is, and shall remain, the discipline and esprit of its soldiers. It should be readily apparent to any observer, friend or foe, that this is an awesome force composed of skilled, and dedicated soldiers who can do things with their hands and weapons better than anyone else. The Rangers serve as the connectivity between the Army's conventional and special operational forces.

The Regiment provides the National Command Authority with a potent and responsive strike force continuously ready for worldwide deployment. The Regiment must remain capable of fighting anytime, anywhere, against any enemy, and winning.

As the standard bearer for the Army, the Regiment will recruit from every sector of the active force. When a Ranger is reassigned at the completion of his tour, he will imbue his new unit with the Regiment's dauntless spirit and high standards.

The Army expects the Regiment to lead the way within the infantry community in modernizing Ranger doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment to meet the challenges of the future. The Army is unswervingly committed to the support of the Regiment and its unique mission.

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX E

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Periodically, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College will sponsor student initiated surveys in support of research studies in the Masters of Military Arts and Sciences program. As part of a research study into the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment, you are being asked to fill out a printed questionnaire. Data from the survey will help identify unique aspects of the 75th Ranger Regiment's unit culture and its affect on leadership practices. The information you provide is purely for academic research.

Before you answer any questions, you will be asked to provide some background information. This information will ensure that the data from your survey is properly categorized for analysis. We do not need to know who you are personally, so do not sign the questionnaire.

All of the questions ask that you select *one* of the answers. However, some questions ask that you write the answer in the space provided. Feel free to add comments that support any answers that you have selected. Several questions ask for your judgment of how strongly you agree or disagree with a particular topic. For the purpose of this survey the choices are defined as follows:

Strongly Agree - Find the statement to be very suitable.

Agree - Find the statement to be generally suitable.

No Opinion - Do not have an opinion.

Disagree - Find the statement to be generally unsuitable.

Strongly Disagree - Find the statement to be very unsuitable.

The value of this study depends on how honestly and carefully you answer the questions. Remember, this is not a test, and there are no right and no wrong answers.

Be sure to answer *all* questions.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Data Section:

Rank: _____

Current Duty Position: _____

Current Unit: _____

Amount of Time in Current Position: _____

All Previous Duty Positions in the 75th Ranger Regiment:

Duty Position: _____	Months Assigned: _____
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Duty Position: _____	Months Assigned: _____
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Duty Position: _____	Months Assigned: _____
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Duty Position: _____	Months Assigned: _____
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Duty Position: _____	Months Assigned: _____
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Survey Questions:

1. The 75th Ranger Regiment has clearly expressed values.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
2. The 75th Ranger Regiment's values are explicitly linked to its mission.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
3. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are explicitly linked to the unit's near-term goals and objectives.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
4. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment affect the day-to-day behaviors and activities of its members.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
5. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's systems.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
6. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's strategies.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
7. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's organizational structure.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
8. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's style.
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree
9. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are established in official and unofficial documents.
a. Yes b. No
10. If you answered yes, then indicate what unit documents contain the 75th Ranger Regiment's values.

11. The 75th Ranger Regiment maintains personnel stability in key positions?
a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

12. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented professional development and training programs to train personnel at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

13. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented quality of life programs for Rangers at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

14. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented developmental programs to provide individual performance appraisal at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

15. The 75th Ranger Regiment's program for entry into the unit, ensures that the best available personnel are selected into the unit.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

16. The 75th Ranger Regiment optimizes each individual's career progression pattern.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

17. The 75th Ranger Regiment supports the use of programs outside of the unit that continue the military and civilian education of its members.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

18. The 75th Ranger Regiment is committed to the development of Rangers at all levels of the organization.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

19. The 75th Ranger Regiment is most committed to mission execution.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

20. The mission of the 75th Ranger Regiment has changed in the past two years.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

21. The mission of the 75th Ranger Regiment has changed since you were first assigned to the unit.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

22. The organizational structure of the 75th Ranger Regiment limits the flow of communications within the Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

23. Within the 75th Ranger Regiment, Standard Operating Procedures outline the methods for solving most operational problems.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

24. Distractions generated within the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution in my unit.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

25. If you agreed or strongly agreed, then indicate what distractions generated within the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution.

26. Distractions generated outside of the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution in my unit.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

27. If you agreed or strongly agreed, then indicate what distractions generated outside of the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution.

28. Units in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique capabilities that are not commonly found in other units.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

29. The 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the capabilities of its units.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

30. Individuals in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique skills that are not commonly found in individuals in other units.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

31. The 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the skills of Rangers at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

32. Within the 75th Ranger Regiment, individuals use their creative skills for solving most operational problems.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

33. An effective, multi-directional flow of information exists in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

34. The 75th Ranger Regiment's policies and instructions are clearly stated.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

35. Members of the 75th Ranger Regiment recognize that an incentive mechanism exists to encourage new ideas within the 75th Ranger Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

36. Members of the 75th Ranger Regiment recognize that the chain of command is interested in hearing new ideas from its members.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

37. The 75th Ranger Regiment often implements new ideas.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

38. There is a low tolerance for deviation from established programs and systems in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

39. The 75th Ranger Regiment effectively adjusts its organizational structure to meet mission requirements

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

40. The organizational structure of the 75th Ranger Regiment is related to how tasks are assigned and completed.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

41. When organizational changes are generated from outside of the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Regiments adjusts efficiently.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

42. Changes in organizational structure have a negative effect on morale in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

43. Changes in organizational structure have a negative effect on personnel in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

44. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, the power to make internal adjustments to organizational structure is centralized.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

45. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, goals are clearly established at Regimental level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

46. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, limits are clearly established by leaders at the Regimental level.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

47. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, your ability to meet goals and objectives is measured.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

48. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, your ability to meet goals and objectives is clearly linked to overall mission execution.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

49. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, long range planning is used to adjust strategies.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

50. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, planning is centralized.

a. Strongly Agree b. Agree c. No Opinion d. Disagree e. Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

	Executive Leaders					Mid-level Leaders				
	SA	A	NO	D	SD	SA	A	NO	D	SD
Q1. The 75th Ranger Regiment has clearly expressed values.	29	1	0	0	0	42	20	0	3	0
Q2. The 75th Ranger Regiment's values are explicitly linked to its mission.	28	2	0	0	0	13	49	0	3	0
Q3. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are explicitly linked to the unit's near-term goals and objectives.	26	4	0	0	0	21	34	7	3	0
Q4. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment affect the day-to-day behaviors and activities of its members.	27	3	0	0	0	33	26	4	2	0
Q5. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's systems.	25	5	0	0	0	21	28	6	10	0
Q6. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's strategies.	26	4	0	0	0	20	34	7	0	4
Q7. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's organizational structure.	17	11	2	0	0	18	31	15	1	0
Q8. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment influence all elements of the unit's style.	22	8	0	0	0	12	46	7	0	0
Q9. The values of the 75th Ranger Regiment are established in official and unofficial documents.	30	0	0	0	0	64	1	0	0	0
Q11. The 75th Ranger Regiment maintains personnel stability in key positions.	5	21	0	2	2	4	48	5	7	1
Q12. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented professional development and training programs to train personnel at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.	11	17	1	1	0	34	27	1	2	1

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NO=No Opinion, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

	Executive Leaders					Mid-level Leaders				
	SA	A	NO	D	SD	SA	A	NO	D	SD
Q13. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented quality of life programs for Rangers at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.	4	20	3	3	0	16	27	11	11	0
Q14. The 75th Ranger Regiment has implemented developmental programs to provide individual performance appraisal at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.	11	15	3	1	0	25	35	5	0	0
Q15. The 75th Ranger Regiment's program for entry into the unit, ensures that the best available personnel are selected into the unit.	23	6	0	1	0	12	30	2	7	14
Q16. The 75th Ranger Regiment optimizes each individual's career progression pattern.	8	14	0	8	0	22	25	10	8	0
Q17. The 75th Ranger Regiment supports the use of programs outside of the unit that continue the military and civilian education of its members.	5	17	6	2	0	16	15	11	23	0
Q18. The 75th Ranger Regiment is committed to the development of Rangers at all levels of the organization.	17	13	0	0	0	33	17	13	2	0
Q19. The 75th Ranger Regiment is most committed to mission execution.	29	1	0	0	0	30	32	1	2	0
Q20. The mission of the 75th Ranger Regiment has changed in the past two years.	3	11	5	9	2	6	18	27	11	3
Q21. The mission of the 75th Ranger Regiment has changed since you were first assigned to the unit.	5	13	1	11	0	28	14	13	8	2
Q22. The organizational structure of the 75th Ranger Regiment limits the flow of communications within the Regiment.	1	6	2	16	5	0	6	18	27	14

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NO=No Opinion, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

	Executive Leaders					Mid-level Leaders				
	SA	A	NO	D	SD	SA	A	NO	D	SD
Q23. Within the 75th Ranger Regiment, Standard Operating Procedures outline the methods for solving most operational problems.	12	17	0	1	0	9	52	0	4	0
Q24. Distractions generated within the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution in my unit.	0	4	5	12	9	2	16	5	39	3
Q26. Distractions generated outside of the 75th Ranger Regiment limit the amount of time spent training, planning, or preparing for mission execution in my unit.	0	7	3	11	9	2	22	27	12	2
Q28. Units in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique capabilities that are not commonly found in other units.	21	9	0	0	0	43	22	0	0	0
Q29. The 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the capabilities of its units.	26	3	1	0	0	31	32	0	2	0
Q30. Individuals in the 75th Ranger Regiment possess unique skills that are not commonly found in individuals in other units.	17	12	1	0	0	38	25	0	1	1
Q31. The 75th Ranger Regiment has successfully implemented training and evaluation programs to improve the skills of Rangers at all levels of the organization, from initial entry to leader level.	19	9	1	1	0	24	25	14	2	0
Q32. Within the 75th Ranger Regiment, individuals use their creative skills for solving most operational problems.	13	17	0	0	0	19	44	2	0	0

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NO=No Opinion, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

	Executive Leaders					Mid-level Leaders				
	SA	A	NO	D	SD	SA	A	NO	D	SD
Q33. An effective, multi-directional flow of information exists in the 75th Ranger Regiment.	4	19	0	7	0	14	27	15	9	0
Q34. The 75th Ranger Regiment's policies and instructions are clearly stated.	15	14	0	1	0	34	29	2	0	0
Q35. Members of the 75th Ranger Regiment recognize that an incentive mechanism exists to encourage new ideas within the 75th Ranger Regiment.	6	12	7	5	0	9	19	20	16	1
Q36. Members of the 75th Ranger Regiment recognize that the chain of command is interested in hearing new ideas from its members.	5	21	4	0	0	10	37	6	11	1
Q37. The 75th Ranger Regiment often implements new ideas.	2	23	4	1	0	14	39	11	0	1
Q38. There is a low tolerance for deviation from established programs and systems in the 75th Ranger Regiment.	1	13	3	13	0	13	13	36	2	1
Q39. The 75th Ranger Regiment effectively adjusts its organizational structure to meet mission requirements.	4	19	2	5	0	15	18	22	8	2
Q40. The organizational structure of the 75th Ranger Regiment is related to how tasks are assigned and completed.	8	14	3	5	0	7	24	18	16	0
Q41. When organizational changes are generated from outside of the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Regiments adjusts efficiently.	7	16	7	0	0	3	28	30	4	0
Q42. Changes in organizational structure have a negative effect on morale in the 75th Ranger Regiment.	0	1	7	20	2	5	17	24	17	2
Q43. Changes in organizational structure have a negative effect on personnel in the 75th Ranger Regiment.	0	1	6	21	2	4	8	29	22	2

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NO=No Opinion, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

	Executive Leaders					Mid-level Leaders				
	SA	A	NO	D	SD	SA	A	NO	D	SD
Q44. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, the power to make internal adjustments to organizational structure is centralized.	2	13	7	7	1	4	10	48	3	0
Q45. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, goals are clearly established at Regimental level.	15	12	3	0	0	22	29	6	8	0
Q46. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, limits are clearly established by leaders at the Regimental level.	9	15	6	0	0	13	35	8	9	0
Q47. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, your ability to meet goals and objectives is measured.	6	21	2	1	0	18	45	2	0	0
Q48. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, your ability to meet goals and objectives is clearly linked to overall mission execution.	10	16	4	0	0	11	48	2	4	0
Q49. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, long range planning is used to adjust strategies.	10	20	0	0	0	13	28	24	0	0
Q50. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, planning is centralized.	7	11	1	11	0	7	16	29	11	2

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NO=No Opinion, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

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


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